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Abstract 
 
 
This paper demonstrates that when an industry faces potential entry and 
this threat of entry constrains pre-entry prices, cost and conduct are not 
identified from the comparative statics of equilibrium. In such a setting, 
the identifying assumption behind the well-established technique of 
relying on exogenous demand perturbations to empirically distinguish 
between alternative hypotheses of conduct is shown to fail. The Brazilian 
cement industry, where the threat of imports restrains market outcomes, 
provides an empirical illustration. In particular, price-cost margins 
estimated using this established technique are considerably biased 
downward, underestimating the degree of market power. A test of 
conduct is proposed, adapted to this constrained setting, which suggests 
that outcomes in the industry are collusive and characterised by market 
division. 
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1 Introduction
Empirical industrial organisation has long been concerned with attempting to measure
the degree of market power enjoyed by firms in an industry. Where marginal cost is
observed, or can be constructed from known technological parameters, market power
can be inferred from the distance between price and cost, informing the researcher of
the pattern of firm conduct in the industry. More often than not, marginal cost is not
observed. In such cases, a well-established approach in the literature attempts to ascer-
tain firm conduct, along with cost, from the comparative statics of equilibrium. By this
approach, a static structural model is specified, typically consisting of a parametric sys-
tem of demand and firm pricing equations (first-order conditions). One then proceeds to
jointly estimate demand, cost and a conduct parameter — indexing the degree of market
power — from price and quantity data, as these are moved around by observed exogenous
shocks to supply and demand. Such a methodology for estimating cost and conduct,
developed by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982), turns on the identifying assumption of
orthogonality between the errors of the firm’s pricing equation and the excluded exoge-
nous variables which move the demand curve. Intuitively, shocks to demand allow one to
observationally distinguish between the hypothesis of a high-cost competitive industry
and the hypothesis of a low-cost collusive industry because the response of prices to these
shocks is diﬀerent according to the kind of firm behaviour in the industry: while price-
taking firms set output at the point where price equals marginal cost as demand moves
exogenously, firms with market power change prices to ensure that marginal revenue is
equated to marginal cost.
In this paper I examine the identification of supply (cost and conduct) in a more
general dynamic setting where an industry faces potential entry and this threat of entry
constrains pre-entry prices. I develop a structural model of a domestic oligopoly which
faces a competitive fringe of elastically-supplied high-cost imports. In equilibrium no
imports are observed yet the threat of imports sets an upper limit on prices, equal to
the marginal cost of imports. I show that when this price limit binds at the indus-
try equilibrium, the identifying assumption of orthogonality between the error term of
the conventional pricing equation and the excluded exogenous demand variables does
not hold. Because the constraint posed by the threat of imports is unaccounted for,
the standard pricing equation specification does not identify cost and conduct from the
comparative statics of demand. In this setting, the standard methodology does not al-
low one to empirically distinguish the hypothesis of a high-cost competitive industry
from the hypothesis of a low-cost cartel where imports restrain prices at the equilib-
rium. Intuitively, the response of prices to fluctuations in demand is no longer distinct
because the threat of imports acts to constrain the ability of the cartel to set marginal
revenue equal to marginal cost. Viewed from a diﬀerent angle, equilibrium market price
elasticities of demand are no longer informative since, irrespective of the hypothesis of
conduct, the equilibrium remains at the kink of the residual demand curve facing the
domestic oligopoly as demand fluctuates.
It is natural that upon not observing imports in equilibrium, or observing no more
than a minimal amount, a researcher may come to overlook the restraining eﬀect of
imports, thereby misspecifying the structural model for the industry and estimating
a static pricing equation imposing the regular moment conditions. It follows that if
the industry enjoys market power, in the sense that equilibrium price-cost margins are
positive, and yet the threat of high-cost imports constrains equilibrium prices, the lack
1
of responsiveness of prices to fluctuations in demand will lead to the underestimation of
the true degree of market power.
To illustrate, I turn to an industry in a country where potential imports restrain
market outcomes: the Brazilian cement industry. Unlike its US counterpart, where the
penetration of imports has ranged between 10 and 20% of domestic consumption in the
past decades, the Brazilian cement industry has historically managed to keep imports at
bay1. This has been achieved thanks to a combination of domestic price controls, trade
barriers, poor infrastructure and a depreciated local currency. At the turn of the 1990s,
as price controls were lifted and Brazil began opening up to trade, the threat of imports
began to develop “bite” on the industry, reinforced by an appreciating local currency.
I consistently estimate demand in each local market (state of the Brazilian federation)
and find very low market price elasticities of demand in equilibrium, of the order of -0.5.
Two main possibilities arise to rationalise why an industry facing such inelastic demand
does not cut output to raise prices to a point where demand is more elastic: (i) there is
weak pricing power (e.g. competition or low concentration), or (ii) some dynamic story
is appropriate, such as the threat of entry (imports) restraining pre-entry prices2. By
way of an illustration, I begin by ignoring the restraining eﬀect of imports and follow the
standard methodology, estimating a pricing equation and instrumenting with exogenous
demand. I obtain cost estimates that are close to prices, suggesting that outcomes in
the Brazilian cement industry are competitive (and the standard conduct parameter is
estimated to be close to zero). To check these estimates, I then construct actual marginal
cost from observed factor prices, the simple fixed-coeﬃcient nature of cement production
technology, and the observed flow of cement from plants to markets. In contrast to the
estimated price-cost margins that are centred around zero, actual price-cost margins
are large, amounting to 40-65% of producer prices (net of sales tax). Producers enjoy
considerable market power despite the binding high-cost imports constraint3. Thus the
standard methodology fails to identify supply, severely underestimating the observed
degree of market power4. This illustrates the theoretical result that when the threat of
entry constrains prices, joint inference of cost and conduct will not be consistent because
of the lack of responsiveness of prices to fluctuations in demand.
Given that cost and conduct cannot be jointly identified from the comparative statics
of equilibrium in this constrained setting, the immediate question is: but what if the
researcher observes marginal cost? Clearly, a direct comparison of marginal cost to price
will provide a test of perfectly competitive behaviour against less competitive models of
firm behaviour (and where imports restrain prices). But, other than perfect competition,
how may one empirically distinguish between two alternative models of behaviour when
aggregate (market) outcomes in both of these models are constrained by the threat of
1The rise of international trade in cement, though puzzling to some, is a fairly recent phenomenon and
has been documented carefully by Dumez and Jeunemaître (2000). Despite high inland transportation
costs, cement can travel — and does travel — quite cheaply from afar by sea via specialised equipment.
2A third possibility hinges on a very special class of models of spatial competition, where a firm is
restricted to set only a “mill” price, with delivered prices to consumers who are distributed over space
being equal to the sum of this mill price and the transportation cost.
3That the high price ceiling set by the high-cost imports binds is then a consequence of the steepness
of the demand curve and this strong price discipline in the industry.
4The estimated coeﬃcients on factor prices and other supply-shifters are mostly of the expected sign
and significant, which could again mislead a researcher into thinking that the econometric model is
appropriately specified. But this owes only to the fact that the estimated coeﬃcients are picking up
the expected correlation between cement prices and factor prices.
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imports, and are thus equal? In the Brazilian cement industry, for example, where high-
cost imports restrain equilibrium prices, one may wish to identify the model of firm
behaviour supporting the constrained outcomes. I propose a test of conduct against a
standard benchmark, the Cournot oligopoly solution. The measure I develop uses firm-
level quantity data to test the hypothesis of Cournot conduct against the alternative
of “more collusive” firm behaviour. It is predicated on the notion that no Cournot
firm can perceive that marginal revenue (taking rivals’ output as given on the margin)
exceeds marginal cost, otherwise the firm would optimally expand output, and this
notion holds regardless of whether the imports constraint binds or not in equilibrium5.
The requirements on the data are large, but the value of the test lies in uncovering
firm-level behaviour when market outcomes are constrained by the threat of entry and
thus the comparative statics of equilibrium are not informative.
I illustrate the proposed test of conduct by reference to the Brazilian cement industry.
I find that conduct across local markets is considerably more collusive than the Cournot
benchmark. Market outcomes are characteristic of (tacit) market division, and this can
be identified despite the threat of imports restraining prices. A story where firm 1 tacitly
agrees to give firm 2 the upper hand in market B in exchange for the latter staying away
from market A — with typically firm 1 (firm 2) being located slightly closer to market A
(market B) than the rival firm6 — helps to explain the observed shipments. Plants ship
to local markets located at their doorstep, while restricting supply to adjacent markets,
despite supplying to these latter markets being highly profitable under the static Cournot
conjecture. I also consider, in light of the diﬀerent local market structures observed in
the Brazilian cement industry, simple dynamic multimarket games which give rise to
such a pattern of conduct in equilibrium. This indicates the rationality of a strategy
of market division in an industry where firms meet in diﬀerent (geographic or product)
markets.
This paper thus makes three contributions. First, it demonstrates that the standard
pricing equation specification does not identify cost and conduct in industries where
potential entry restrains pre-entry market outcomes, such as domestic oligopolies facing
(underlying) competition from abroad7. The conventional identifying assumption is not
satisfied; in particular the estimated degree of market power will be biased downward.
The implication of this latent eﬀect of imports for antitrust authorities attempting to
measure the competitiveness of conduct is increasingly relevant in a world where trade
barriers are being pulled down8. Second, I develop a test of conduct in such settings
where potential entry may constrain equilibrium prices. By reference to this test, I
5The reverse notion, that a Cournot firm optimally cuts output when its perceived marginal revenue
(were imports not to exist) falls short of marginal cost, no longer holds when the price ceiling imposed
by imports binds in equilibrium: cutting output in an attempt to raise price above the price ceiling
simply opens the door to imports.
6“Slightly closer” is employed in the sense that the freight cost, while important to the cost structure
of the industry, clearly does not explain the observed pattern of shipments.
7In addition to potential entry, other “invisible” constraints may be conceived, such as pressure
from antitrust authorities. Antitrust authorities are typically fond of “barking” at industries perceived
to have market power in the hope of exerting downward pressure on prices. To the extent that some
pressure is indeed exerted — i.e. some of the bark having bite — such a restraint provides another channel
by which the standard methodology yields a downward-biased estimate of market power.
8The constraint of imports on market outcomes is not new, however. As I later comment, in a
study of the US sugar industry at the turn of the 20th century, Genesove and Mullin (1998) state that
“industry pricing was constrained by threats of (domestic) entry or of foreign imports” (p. 367).
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show that market outcomes in the Brazilian cement industry are indicative of (tacit)
market division. The third contribution has policy implications in relation to the cement
industry, particularly in developing countries. In a developing country such as Brazil,
with its huge housing deficit and infrastructure needs, the importance of the cement
industry cannot be overstated. Cement is an essential input to construction and building
activity for which there are few substitutes. The industry regularly attracts attention
from antitrust authorities, consumer associations and the financial media for its alleged
pricing power. Yet to date no study has been undertaken to empirically ascertain the
degree of competition in the industry by estimating a structural model using a rich
original dataset. This study attempts to fill this void. A clear policy recommendation
is that fostering imports can play an important role in curbing the ability of domestic
producers to raise prices above marginal cost. In Brazil, recent policy experience has
been the opposite; the government has succumbed to the industry’s “anti-dumping”
lobby and raised the barriers to entry of imports, to the detriment of consumer welfare.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 I develop the theoretical framework
and address identification. I then turn to institutional aspects of the cement industry,
and present the data. Section 4 presents the application. (Appendices A and B provide
a discussion of the sources and treatment of the data used, and all manner of robust-
ness checks regarding the construction of marginal cost and the structural estimation.)
Finally, I conclude, reflecting on the policy implications of this paper.
2 Theoretical framework: Towards a test of conduct
In this section I develop a structural model of an oligopoly facing potential entry, where
this threat of entry may limit pre-entry prices. Potential entry is modelled as a competi-
tive fringe of foreign suppliers (imports) to the domestic oligopoly market. I then extend
the analysis of identification of cost and conduct underlying the standard methodology
from the static setting considered by Bresnahan (1982, 1989) to the present constrained
setting, where the threat of imports may be constraining market outcomes. I show that
the identifying assumption of orthogonality between the error term of the conventional
pricing equation and the excluded exogenous demand variables does not hold. Esti-
mates of cost and conduct parameters will be inconsistent; in particular, the degree of
competition will be overestimated.
I then consider how a researcher may learn about conduct in an oligopoly facing
potential competition from imports. I consider a situation where firms in the domestic
oligopoly meet in diﬀerent spatial (or product) markets and two data requirements on
the part of the researcher are met: (i) direct measures of marginal cost are available,
and (ii) firm-level quantity data is available (at the local market level). I specify a test
of conduct based on Cournot behaviour adapted to the constrained setting. This test
can reveal details regarding the pattern of conduct prevailing in the industry, despite
aggregate outcomes being constrained in equilibrium by the presence of imports.
2.1 Domestic monopoly facing competition from imports
Consider a monopolistM producing a homogeneous good at flat marginal cost cM . The
monopolist faces a competitive fringe of foreign suppliers (labelled I for imports), with
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perfectly-elastic supply at marginal cost cI > cM . In general, the equilibrium is given
by either of two situations. If the marginal cost of imports is lower than the monopoly
price in the absence of imports (denoted pM), the price in equilibrium will be equal to
the marginal cost of imports, the monopolist will supply the entire domestic market, yet
the foreign fringe exerts downward pressure on price. Alternatively, if the marginal cost
of imports exceeds the monopoly price pM , imports have no “bite” and the equilibrium
price will be pM , with the monopolist again supplying the entire market though in an
unconstrained manner. Formally, the equilibrium price p is given by
p =
½
cI if pM ≥ cI
pM otherwise
where pM = p(qM), p(q) is the inverse demand function and qM is the quantity that
equates the market marginal revenue MR(q) to the monopolist’s marginal cost cM .
Given the assumption that cI > cM (imports are high cost), the monopolist always
supplies the entire market. Clearly, when pM ≥ cI , the extreme result of imports com-
manding zero sales rests on the assumption of perfectly-elastic supply from the foreign
fringe9.
An illustration 1 Assume demand is linear, given by p = 16 − 1
10
q and cM = 4. As
shown in Figure 1, the monopoly price is pM = 10. If cI ≥ 10 (left panel), the equilibrium
price is p = 10 and the monopolist supplies q = 60. Notice that the equilibrium market
price elasticity of demand η(q) := ∂ ln q∂ ln p(q) ' −1.67. Now consider (4 <)cI ≤ 10, say
cI = 6 as illustrated in the right panel. The market equilibrium now lies at the kink
in the residual demand curve faced by the monopolist: p = 6 and the monopolist
supplies q = 100. At the equilibrium, while the price elasticity of demand faced by the
monopolist is infinitely high in absolute value, the market price elasticity of demand is
only η(100) = −0.6. Around this latter equilibrium, fluctuations in the marginal cost of
imports, say due to fluctuations in the exchange rate, allow one to trace out the demand
curve since the kinked equilibrium moves up and down along the market demand curve.
9As is typically the case with “limit price” models such as the one developed here, one needs to
deal with the following question: why does the monopolist need to set a price as low as the limit price,
in order to stave oﬀ entry (imports), if what is relevant to the entry decision is the post-entry price
rather than the pre-entry one? In considering such a question, one could ponder why (in the situation
of interest where imports do have bite, pM ≥ cI) the monopolist would not set the monopoly price pM
if it is able to cut its price to the importer’s cost cI immediately upon entry. When entry (and exit) is
free and there is no entry lag, as is the case in the setting I am considering, where the entrant consists
of opportunistic imports in a well-functioning international trading market, the monopolist will set the
limit price. In this paper’s application to the Brazilian cement industry, I later consider institutional
aspects of the industry that further support the use of a limit-price model. More generally, it may
also be argued that the threat of entry does constrain pre-entry prices, even if entry were not free,
since pre-entry prices reveal information to the entrant about post-entry prices, such as the cost of the
incumbent and/or its disposition to fight if faced with entry (i.e. a predation story of the reputational
type). Finally, note that for the purpose of this paper one need not strictly interpret cI as the exact
cost of imports, but more loosely as a price lower than that set by the monopolist were it to act in an
unconstrained manner.
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Figure 1: Monopolist facing a competitive fringe. Left panel: Imports have no “bite”
(pM < cI). Right panel: Imports constrain price in equilibrium (pM ≥ cI).
2.2 Econometric identification of conduct when costs are not
observed
Market demand parameters may be identified from standard cost-shifters excluded from
the demand function (left panel of Figure 1) or, in the case where imports restrain prices,
from fluctuations in the marginal cost of imports, such as movements in the exchange
rate (right panel). But, in the absence of information on cost, will conduct (and thus
cost) be identified from the comparative statics of demand?
In the absence of potential entry, conduct is identified (Bresnahan 1982)
When imports do not constrain prices, as in the left panel of Figure 1, conduct is
identified from fluctuations in the demand curve. Suppose we wish to distinguish between
alternative behavioural hypotheses generating observed price and quantity data: on the
one hand a low-cost monopoly or cartel (with cost cM), and on the other hand a high-
cost competitive industry (with cost cC). When marginal cost is flat in quantity, mere
shifts in the demand curve suﬃce to empirically distinguish the behaviour of a cartel
from that of a competitive industry. Rotations of the demand curve will likewise identify
conduct. (When marginal cost varies in quantity, only rotations of the demand curve will
identify conduct.) Thus demand, cost and conduct parameters are jointly estimated from
observed price and quantity data and observed exogenous demand and cost shifters. The
reasoning is captured intuitively in Figure 2, where marginal cost is flat. The left panel
indicates how a shift in the demand curve has diﬀerent eﬀects on the initial industry
equilibrium E1 according to the hypothesis of conduct: the equilibrium shifts to EC2 if
pricing is competitive while shifting to EM2 if there is market power (output expands only
to where marginal revenue equals marginal cost). Similarly, the right panel illustrates
how demand rotators identify conduct: there is no eﬀect on the industry equilibrium if
pricing is competitive (i.e. E1 = EC3 ), yet the equilibrium shifts to EM3 under a cartel.
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Figure 2: Identification in a static model. Left panel: Demand shifts. Right panel:
Demand rotates.
When potential entry constrains pre-entry prices, conduct is not identified
Now modify the cartel hypothesis so that the domestic industry with low cost cM faces
a competitive fringe of imports, with perfectly-elastic supply at high cost cC that con-
strains price, as in the model of Section 2.1 (with cI = cC). In other words, under the
hypothesis of a cartel, imports restrict the price to be cC and the equilibrium lies at the
kink in the residual demand curve facing the domestic industry (otherwise, for a high
enough marginal cost of imports, we are back to the unconstrained situation considered
in Bresnahan 1982). We wish to empirically distinguish this constrained low-cost cartel
hypothesis from the alternative hypothesis of a high-cost competitive (domestic) indus-
try, with cost cC (and where the presence of imports becomes irrelevant). In Figure 3,
the equilibrium is initially at E1. In the left panel, a shift in the demand curve moves
the equilibrium to E2 under both alternative hypotheses. In the right panel, a rotation
of the demand curve around the equilibrium point E1 does not move the equilibrium
point under either hypothesis. Thus, in this dynamic setting, unless marginal costs are
observed, there is no observable distinction between the hypothesis of a low-cost cartel
(with imports restraining prices to be cC) and the hypothesis of high-cost (domestic)
competition10.
Why is conduct no longer identified? Consider, say, rotations of the demand curve.
Intuitively, in the absence of imports, such rotations identify conduct because firms with
market power change prices when demand moves exogenously to ensure that marginal
revenue is equated to marginal cost. Now, the threat of imports acts to constrain their
ability to set (market) marginal revenue equal to marginal cost and therefore removes the
source of price variation which allows conduct to be identified. Viewed from a diﬀerent
angle, equilibrium market price elasticities of demand are no longer informative since the
10Fluctuations in the demand curve can be broken down into rotations around the price intercept and
parallel shifts. When marginal cost is flat, identification is possible only from parallel inward shifts of
the demand curve, when these shifts are suﬃciently large (we are then back to the situation considered
in Bresnahan 1982). Identification is not possible for rotations around the price intercept.
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Figure 3: Conduct is no longer identified under the threat of entry. Left panel: Demand
shifts. Right panel: Demand rotates.
equilibrium lies at the kink of the residual demand curve facing the domestic oligopoly
(see below).
Thus, comparing figures 2 and 3, notice that while fluctuations in the demand curve
in the former figure lead to changes in prices under monopoly but not under competition,
these same fluctuations in the latter figure leave prices unchanged under both monopoly
(facing imports) and competition. In the right panel of Figure 3, for example, a rota-
tion of the demand curve around the initial equilibrium point E1 does not change the
equilibrium price (and quantity) under both hypotheses of competition and collusion.
Overlooking the eﬀect of imports and misspecifying the structural model to be that cap-
tured in the right panel of Figure 2 (Bresnahan 1982), a researcher would interpret the
stationarity of equilibrium prices as evidence to reject (low-cost) collusion in favour of
(high-cost) competition, regardless of the true behavioural model generating the data.
(Similarly, for a shift in the demand curve as depicted in the left panel of Figure 3, the
equilibrium price would again remain unchanged under both hypotheses of competition
and collusion. By misspecifying the structural model to be that captured in the left
panel of Figure 2, one would mistakenly reject collusion in favour of competition, since
no price change is observed following a shift in the demand curve.) The more general
point is that by misspecifying the structural model and not accounting for the price-
constraining eﬀect of imports (or entry), a researcher could be misled into overestimating
the extent of competition in the industry, further (residually) overestimating costs.
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Estimation of a static pricing equation In the empirical literature on conduct,
the following static pricing equation is typically specified on the supply side11:
p+ θq∂p(q)
∂q
= c (1)
where p is price, q is industry output, c is marginal cost and θ is a conduct parameter.
One reason why specification (1) may have become so popular is that it nests first-
order conditions corresponding to the oligopoly models of monopoly or perfect collusion
(where the firm internalises the aggregate inframarginal revenue change from a marginal
change in output, so that θ = 1) and perfect competition (where θ = 0), among other
models (e.g. symmetric Cournot, θ being the reciprocal of the number of firms in the
industry)12. Pricing equation (1) can be rearranged to the familiar “elasticity-adjusted
Lerner index” (or price-cost mark-up):
θ = −η(p)p− c
p
(2)
where η(p) is the market price elasticity of demand. Clearly, such a specification captures
the supply decisions depicted in Figure 2, in the absence of imports, under the alternative
hypotheses of conduct13. Econometrically, (1) may be implemented by including a zero-
mean error term εs and proceeding to the estimation of
p = −θq∂p(q)
∂q
+ c+ εs (3)
where p and q are observed, ∂p(q)∂q has previously been consistently estimated, and one
wishes to estimate θ and c. Since q ∂p(q)∂q is endogenous, one needs to find excluded
instruments from (3). In the absence of imports, exogenous demand variables Y will serve
as instruments, since they are correlated with the endogenous variable but uncorrelated
with the error εs. This is clear from the exogenous fluctuations in demand pictured
in Figure 2. Specification (3) is then estimated by IV or GMM and the identifying
assumption is
E(Y 0εs) = 0
11Examples include Gollop and Roberts (1979), Roberts (1983), Porter (1983), Suslow (1986), Bres-
nahan (1987), Brander and Zhang (1990), Nevo (2001) and Slade (2004). Note that here I abstract
from a criticism that has been made regarding this approach on the grounds that oligopoly theory to
date does not underpin a continuum of values for conduct that would support its free estimation (see,
e.g., Reiss and Wolak 2002).
12Note that (1) can be specified at the industry or at the firm level. In the latter case one may
include a subscript f for the conduct and cost parameters, to denote the firm. An industry-level
pricing equation can be viewed as the average across firms’ individual pricing equations (weighted or
not by firms’ shares), in which case θ has the interpretation of “the average collusiveness of conduct”
(Bresnahan 1989). Note also that a common alternative to (1) in the literature consists of replacing the
inframarginal revenue term θfq ∂p(q)∂q by θfqf
∂p(q)
∂q , i.e. replacing industry output q by firm output qf
in firm f ’s pricing equation. From the first-order condition, the conduct parameter then corresponds
to dq/dqf , which some have interpreted as a “conjectural variation”: by this view, upon expanding
its output by dqf , firm f would hold a “conjecture” dq with respect to the resulting aggregate output
expansion.
13Notice that the vertical distance between the (inverse) demand function and the marginal revenue
function is equal to −q ∂p(q)∂q . Under the unconstrained monopoly equilibrium of Figure 2 this distance
is always equal to p− c. In contrast, in the constrained monopoly equilibrium of Figure 3 this distance
will exceed p− c.
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The problem with the standard methodology arises in the presence of potential im-
ports (entry), since to the extent that imports constrain market outcomes, fluctuations
in the demand curve will be correlated with the error in the specified pricing equation.
Due to the price ceiling set by imports, the true model — the data generating process —
is given by14
p = min
µ
−θq∂p(q)
∂q
+ c+ εs, cI
¶
(4)
The standard pricing equation which is taken to the data — the estimated model — is,
however:
p = −θq∂p(q)
∂q
+ c + ξs (5)
where the (mis)specified pricing equation error is denoted ξs. The theoretical specifica-
tion (1) that underlies the estimated model (5) fails to adequately capture the supply
decisions (4) of an industry with pricing power facing the threat of high-cost imports.
This is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Non-identification of conduct) When the threat of entry constrains
prices set by an industry with market power, the residual ξs in the standard pricing
equation is negatively correlated with the excluded exogenous demand variables Y :
E(Y 0ξs) < 0
Consequently, IV (or GMM) estimation using demand perturbations Y will yield incon-
sistent estimates of conduct and cost. In particular, the true degree of market power θ
will be underestimated.
Proof. Let X1 := −q ∂p(q)∂q . From (4) and (5), the DGP can be rewritten as p =
min (θX1 + c+ εs, cI) and the estimated model is p = θX1+c+ξs. We wish to determine
E(Y 0ξs). The error of the estimated model is
ξs = εs1[θX1 + c+ εs < cI ] + (cI − θX1 − c)(1− 1[θX1 + c + εs < cI ]) (6)
= εsχ+ (cI − θX1 − c)(1− χ)
where the indicator function χ := 1[εs < cI − θX1− c] = 1 when the market equilibrium
is unconstrained by the threat of entry (imports have no bite) and χ = 0 when the
equilibrium is constrained. (It is clear from (6) that the data generating process is a
generalisation of the static model considered by Bresnahan (1982); this static model
would correspond to a specific situation where χ = 1 for all market outcomes, i.e.
market outcomes are never constrained.) Assuming that the unobserved supply shock
εs is orthogonal to the excluded exogenous demand variables Y , E(Y 0εs) = 0, one may
write
E(Y 0ξs) = E (Y 0εsχ+ Y 0(cI − θX1 − c)(1− χ))
≤ E (Y 0εsχ+ Y 0εs(1− χ)) = E (Y 0εs) = 0
14It is clear from (4) that, ceteris paribus, the likelihood that the imports constraint binds and thus
p = cI is higher (i) the more collusive is conduct, i.e. the higher is θ; (ii) the steeper is the demand
curve, i.e. the higher is −q(∂p(q)/∂q); (iii) the higher is the domestic industry’s marginal cost c; and
(iv) the lower is the marginal cost of imports cI .
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where the inequality follows from the fact that 1− χ = 1 when εs ≥ cI − θX1 − c (i.e.
when the equilibrium is constrained) and 1−χ = 0 otherwise, along with the assumption
that Y > 0.
Further, let marginal cost be linear in X2, where X2 is an N × (K − 1) matrix of
observed variables, both exogenous (such as factor prices, including a constant) and
endogenous (such as quantity): c = X2β2. Group the regressors of the estimated model
into an N ×K matrix, X := (X1, X2), and the parameters to be estimated into a K × 1
vector β := (θ, β2). The estimated model is then p = Xβ + ξs. Denote as Z the matrix
of instruments, containing the exogenous elements of X2 and the excluded exogenous
demand variables Y , and assume the rank condition for identification holds. The 2SLS
estimator is given by
βˆ = (X 0Z(Z 0Z)−1Z 0X)−1X 0Z(Z 0Z)−1Z 0p
= β + ( 1
N
X 0Z( 1
N
Z 0Z)−1 1
N
Z 0X)−1 1
N
X 0Z( 1
N
Z 0Z)−1 1
N
Z 0ξs
Noting that (i) E(X 0Z) and E(Z 0Z) are positive definite, and (ii) E(Z 0ξs) contains either
0 or negative elements (since E(Y 0ξs) < 0), the application of the law of large numbers
to each term along with Slutsky’s theorem yields
plim βˆ < β
In particular, plim θˆ < θ.
The failure of the orthogonality condition can readily be seen in the linear demand
example of Figure 3, as I show next.
Example: Shifts and rotations with linear demand Begin by considering a shift
in the demand curve as depicted in the left panel of Figure 3. Say the inverse linear
demand curve p = a − bq shifts outward to p = a0 − bq, where a0 − a = da > 0.
Recall that under both alternative hypotheses of conduct — low-cost cartel constrained
by imports, and high-cost competitive industry — the equilibrium shifts from E1 to E2,
where dp = 0 and dq = dab . Plugging this into the total derivative of the static pricing
equation (5)15 and noting that the demand slope ∂p(q)∂q remains unchanged at −b, one
obtains 0 = −θ
¡
(−b)(dab ) + 0
¢
+ dξs. Thus
dξs = −θda
from which it is clear that shifts in the demand curve are correlated with the error in
the pricing equation (unless, of course, there is competition: θ = 0) . Now consider
a rotation in the demand curve around E1 (right panel of Figure 3). Say the inverse
demand curve p = a−bq rotates anticlockwise around E1 = (q1, p1) to p = a0−b0q, where
b0 − b = db < 0 and thus a0 − a = da = db.q1 < 0. Under both alternative hypotheses
of conduct, the equilibrium remains stationed at E1, and thus dp = dq = 0. Plugging
this into the total derivative of the static pricing equation and noting that the change
in the demand slope d(∂p(q)∂q ) = −db, one obtains 0 = −θ (0 + (−db)q1) + dξ
s. Recalling
that da = q1db, this translates into
dξs = −θq1db = −θda
15This may be written dp = −θ
³
∂p(q)
∂q dq + d(
∂p(q)
∂q )q
´
+ dξs, considering θ and c are constant.
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so that rotations in the demand curve around the equilibrium are correlated with the
error in the pricing equation.
The limit-price model considered in this paper provides an example where joint esti-
mation of conduct and costs from a static pricing equation will perform poorly. Another
example is provided by Corts (1999) who considers a dynamic model of collusion in a sim-
ple linear-demand, homogeneous-good oligopoly with symmetric and flat marginal costs,
in which punishment is characterised by Cournot behaviour forever16. He simulates mar-
ket outcomes according to varying assumptions on the persistence of exogenous demand
shocks and then shows that estimation of a static pricing equation will in many instances
underestimate the degree of market power, as measured by the elasticity-adjusted Lerner
index (2). The thrust of his argument is that while the estimated conduct parameter
is determined by the marginal responsiveness of equilibrium quantity (and thus price
and the mark-up) to exogenous perturbations of demand, market power is defined by
the level of the price-cost margin. The estimated conduct parameter will accurately
capture market power “only if the true process underlying the observed equilibrium
generates behaviour that is identical on the margin, and not just on average, to a con-
jectural variations game” (p. 234; by a “conjectural variations” model the author means
a model nested in (1) — see my footnote 12). This is clearly not the case for the imports-
constrained oligopoly just outlined. As the above discussion makes clear, another way
of putting Corts’ argument is by stating that the errors in the pricing equation (5) are
correlated with the demand shocks Y typically used as instruments.
The implication of Proposition 1 for empirical work is clear. Consider an industry
where firms have market power (θ > 0) and the threat of high-cost imports constrains
prices in equilibrium for at least a subset of the data. (In the notation of the proof
of Proposition 1, this corresponds to Pr(χ = 0) =Pr(εs ≥ cI − θX1 − c) > 0 in the
available sample.) Suppose a researcher, observing the negligible penetration of imports
in equilibrium, fails to realise the price-restraining eﬀect of imports and runs specification
(5) on the data, thinking that the data generating process is (3), when it is actually
(4)17. Thinking that he is imposing E(Y 0εs) = 0, when in fact he is incorrectly imposing
E(Y 0ξs) = 0, the researcher would obtain inconsistent estimates of conduct and cost.
The estimated conduct parameter θˆ will lie below the “true” value θ = η(p)p−cp , as defined
in (2), underestimating the degree of market power. Intuitively, since prices do not
respond to demand shocks as seen above, the coeﬃcient on −q ∂p(q)∂q will be biased toward
zero. The extent to which potential imports (and entry in general) constrain market
outcomes is an empirical question. I briefly illustrate the relevance of the restraining
eﬀect of imports by reference to a seminal study of the US sugar industry.
16Corts’ (1999) illustration is reminiscent of the Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) supergame model of
collusion with stochastic demand.
17Note that were the researcher aware of the price-restraining eﬀect of imports on a subset of the data,
and were able to “separate the wheat from the chaﬀ”, he could implement the standard methodology
using the unconstrained outcomes only (i.e. where χ = 1), or in principle he could use switching
regression techniques. Typically (i) the constraining eﬀect of potential entry may be overlooked since
entry is not observed in equilibrium; (ii) the level at which the constraint binds fluctuates and is
unobserved (e.g. in the example of footnote 7, the level at which the antitrust bark has bite is by
no means clear or stable over time); and (iii) though this is currently work in progress, it would seem
that a necessary condition for identification using switching regression is the observation of independent
variation in the exogenous variables, such as the marginal cost of imports and the marginal cost of the
domestic industry.
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US sugar industry (Genesove and Mullin 1998): constrained market out-
comes? Genesove and Mullin (1998) examine the US sugar industry at the turn of the
20th century to test the estimation of cost and conduct using the standard static pricing
equation (3). Thanks to the simple production technology of the industry, marginal cost
is observed and can be used to check the performance of the estimation methodology,
which they find “performs reasonably well in estimating θ” (p. 370). However, though
the diﬀerence is small, the estimated conduct parameter θˆ is lower than the direct mea-
sure of market power θ obtained from (2). Interestingly, the authors state that this direct
measure of market power θ would “suggest a more competitive environment than one
would expect from an industry that averaged six firms and whose largest firm had an
average market share of 63%” (p. 367), and that the “likely explanation is that industry
pricing was constrained by threats of (domestic) entry or of foreign imports” (p. 367),
despite “very little” sugar actually being imported into the US18. Genesove and Mullin
point out that: “Although we acknowledge the influence of these competitive fringes,
they are not formally incorporated into our analysis” (p. 359). This section’s analysis
suggests that to the extent that market outcomes in the sugar industry were constrained
by the threat of entry, this would lead to a downward bias in the estimated degree of
market power.
In Section 4 I develop an example using the Brazilian cement industry where market
outcomes are constrained by the threat of imports. I illustrate how poorly the standard
methodology may perform in such a setting: the estimated conduct parameter consid-
erably understates the direct measure of market power (based on a direct measure of
marginal cost). I then use firm-level data to delve deeper into the pattern of conduct in
the industry. To this end, we need to consider other models of conduct in the imports-
constrained oligopoly model, in addition to the model of monopoly seen at the beginning
of this section.
2.3 From monopoly to oligopoly
The next question is: what are the equilibrium outcomes when there is a domestic
oligopoly comprised of n ≥ 2 firms, instead of a monopoly? Clearly this will depend on
the conduct of the domestic firms facing the competitive fringe of imports. I will consider
the non-trivial case of imports restraining prices pM ≥ cI (right panel of Figure 1), since
the complementary case where imports do not restrain even a monopolist pM < cI is
standard (left panel of Figure 1). I now consider the benchmark models of collusion,
Bertrand and Cournot.
Under the most collusive outcome, the equilibrium price is p = cI and the oligopoly’s
joint output is q = p−1(cI), the same output as that of a monopolist (recall Section
2.1). In a non-cooperative framework with heterogeneous firms, where side payments
are not allowed, output will need to be shared among the firms according to some rule
18Further evidence of the price-constraining eﬀect of imports is provided: “Although very little refined
sugar was ever imported into the United States, in the early years of the Sugar Trust (the largest firm)
the threat of European imports aﬀected U.S. prices. In 1888 and 1894, Havemeyer (the Sugar Trust’s
president) acknowledged setting the price of refined sugar so that none would be imported from Europe”
(p. 358; parentheses added). Note that the authors’ low direct measure of market power θ stems from
a low observed price-cost mark-up p−cp and a moderate elasticity η(p) (of around −1.05 for most part
of the year).
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or historical pattern19. In a spatial context, where the oligopoly consists of firms with
multiple plants scattered across space, meeting each other in diﬀerent local markets, one
possibility is to have the most eﬃcient firm in a given local market supply a large share
of output. The most eﬃcient (lower cost) firm in a local market could be the firm with
the plant located closest to that market, thus incurring lower transport costs. To the
extent that firms’ plant configurations are “suﬃciently” symmetric, with diﬀerent firms
being the low-cost producer in diﬀerent markets, the restriction of no side payments can
be circumvented and aggregate industry profits can be increased20. I return to collusion
under multimarket contact (as it applies to the Brazilian cement industry) in Section
4.4.221.
Under the other polar model of Bertrand competition, the equilibrium price is equal
to the marginal cost of the second most eﬃcient plant. Label firms 1 and 2 as the lowest-
cost firm and the next lowest cost firm respectively, i.e. c1 ≤ c2(< cI). The equilibrium
price is then p = c2, with firm 1 supplying the entire market with q1 = p−1(c2). This
situation is similar to that depicted in the right panel of Figure 1, where it is the next
lowest cost firm 2 rather than imports that restrains prices.
Consider finally the standard case of Cournot behaviour among the n firms in the
domestic oligopoly22. Consider the output decision of firm f . In the absence of imports,
denote firm f ’s reaction function qf = Rf(q−f), where q−f :=
P
j 6=f qj is the joint output
of its (domestic) rivals. (This reaction function is derived from the firm’s Cournot first-
order condition and is drawn as the steeper line in the left panel of Figure 4.) In
the presence of imports, imports occur if p(qf + q−f) > cI , or equivalently if qf + q−f <
p−1(cI), i.e. if domestic output is restricted to fall short of the quantity level at which the
marginal cost of imports crosses the demand curve. In this case, where qf+q−f < p−1(cI),
the quantity of imports is positive and equal to qimports = p−1(cI)− qf − q−f , so that
total supply is qf+q−f+qimports = p−1(cI). Thus qf+q−f ≥ p−1(cI) defines the “imports
constraint”: its boundary is drawn as the less steep line, of slope −1, in the left panel
of Figure 4. Clearly, the perfectly-elastic supply of imports ensures that, given the joint
output of its rivals q−f , Cournot firm f will set its output such that price is at most equal
to the marginal cost of imports, such that imports do not occur. Hence, in the presence
of imports, firm f ’s best response to the joint output of its rivals q−f will correspond
to the outer envelope to its reaction function in the absence of imports, Rf(q−f ), and
the boundary to the imports constraint, qf + q−f = p−1(cI); denote this “constrained”
reaction function as
qf = R˜f (q−f ; cI) := max(Rf(q−f ), p−1(cI)− q−f )
19As before, assume flat marginal costs. With homogeneous firms, sharing output equally among the
firms — as well as any alternative allocation — maximises joint profits. With heterogeneous firms, were
side payments allowed, the optimal allocation rule is to have the low cost firm supply the entire market.
20Bernheim and Whinston (1990) explore the incentive constraints under multimarket contact. By
pooling a firm’s incentive constraints across markets, its share in those markets where it enjoys a low
cost (i.e. “on its own turf”) may be increased at the expense of its share in markets where it has a high
cost. See Section 4.4.2.
21Notice that the price limit set by the delivered cost of imports cI may provide a natural focal price
for coordination. (I thank Margaret Slade for pointing out that this observation is consistent with the
Eastman-Stykolt (1966) hypothesis, where by providing the domestic industry with a collusive focal
point equal to the world price plus tariﬀ, protection may facilitate oligopolistic coordination of the
protected firms. See Harris (1984).)
22For a model with a similar flavour where a Cournot oligopoly may deter entry by producing the
limit output, see Gilbert and Vives (1986) (I thank Xavier Vives for pointing this out to me).
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R˜f (q−f ; cI) is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 4 as the thick curve. Notice that
when Rf (0) < p−1(cI), as drawn, Rf (q−f) will cross qf +q−f = p−1(cI). For high enough
q−f such that R˜f(q−f ; cI) + q−f ≥ p−1(cI), firm f ’s optimal reply in the presence of
imports is to set the same quantity that it would set in the absence of imports (and the
corresponding market price is lower than cI). This steeper upper segment of firm f ’s
constrained reaction function R˜f(q−f ; cI) is collinear with the reaction function in the
absence of imports Rf (q−f), and the standard Cournot pricing equation holds:
p(q) + p(q)
η(q)
qf
q
= cf (7)
where as before η(q) is the market price elasticity of demand and q = qf + q−f . Now, for
lower q−f such that R˜f(q−f ; cI) + q−f = p−1(cI) (i.e. R˜f(q−f ; cI) ≥ Rf(q−f )), firm f ’s
optimal reply in the presence of imports exceeds the quantity that it would set in the
absence of imports, and price equals cI (since otherwise imports would occur and price
would still be equal to cI). Here, along the flatter segment of firm f ’s constrained reaction
function R˜f (q−f ; cI), firm f ’s (perceived) marginal revenue falls short of marginal cost:
p(q) +
p(q)
η(q)
qf
q
< cf (8)
Conditions (7) and (8) combine to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (“Constrained” Cournot first-order condition) In the presence of im-
ports, if firm f behaves as a Cournot player, it will be the case that
p(q) + p(q)
η(q)
qf
q
≤ cf (9)
This condition holds as a strict inequality when the “imports constraint” qf + q−f ≥
p−1(cI) binds, in which case price is equal to the marginal cost of imports cI.23
The set of Cournot equilibria is found by similarly deriving the rival firms’ constrained
joint reaction function q−f = R˜−f(qf ; cI), which is again the outer envelope of the joint
reaction function in the absence of imports q−f = R−f (qf) and the boundary to the
imports constraint, qf + q−f = p−1(cI). The set of equilibria is the intersection of
qf = R˜f(q−f ; cI) and q−f = R˜−f(qf ; cI). For a low enough cost of imports (i.e. an
imports boundary suﬃciently far from the origin, as drawn in the right panel of Figure
4 for the next illustration), there are multiple equilibria and imports restrain prices at
the Cournot equilibrium24.
23Condition (9) also holds as an inequality in the case of a corner solution (i.e. p(q−f ) < cf such that
qf = Rf (q−f ) = 0), but this is standard so is omitted from the proposition.
24In the absence of imports, the unique Cournot equilibrium outcome (qCf , qC−f ) is defined implicitly
by qCf = Rf (R−f (qCf )) and qC−f = R−f (Rf (qC−f )). Formally, imports have bite under Cournot conduct
if p(qCf + qC−f ) > cI , or equivalently when qCf + qC−f < p−1(cI).
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Figure 4: Cournot oligopoly facing a competitive fringe of imports. Left panel: Cournot
firm f ’s reaction function, facing domestic rivals and imports. Right panel: Cournot
equilibria. Drawn for linear demand and cI = 6 as in the right panel of Figure 1.
An illustration 2 This is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 4, drawn assuming
the linear demand function p = 16 − 1
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q and cI = 6 of the earlier illustration to the
domestic monopoly case (see the right panel of Figure 1), and adding the assumption
that there are n = 3 firms, that the marginal cost of the firm of interest f is cf = 4.5 and
that
P
j 6=f cj = 8.5.25 In the absence of imports (or were cI > p(87.5) = 7.25 instead of
6), joint output and price in the Cournot oligopoly would respectively be 87.5 and 7.25
in equilibrium. In the presence of imports, where cI = 6, joint output and price in the
constrained Cournot equilibrium are respectively 100 and 6. This joint outcome is the
same as the most collusive outcome of Illustration 1 in Section 2.1.
2.4 From theory to application: inference of conduct in the
presence of potential imports (when costs are observed)
I argued in Section 2.2 that, in the presence of potential imports, estimation of a static
pricing equation imposing the regular moment conditions yields inconsistent estimates
of conduct and cost parameters. The immediate question is then: But what if the
researcher observes (domestic firms’) marginal cost? In a setting where imports restrain
prices at the industry equilibrium, how can one then identify firm conduct?
Clearly, a direct comparison of marginal cost to price will provide a test of competitive
behaviour against less competitive models of firm behaviour (and where imports may
restrain prices). However, consider the following hypothetical situation. Suppose that
prices exceed observed costs and that imports restrain prices were firms to behave à la
25For example, if one of firm f ’s rivals has the same marginal cost as the earlier monopolist, of 4,
then the remaining rival has a marginal cost equal to that of firm f , of 4.5.
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Cournot, let alone restrain prices were firms to alternatively engage in collusion. One
wishes to identify, from the constrained prices and quantities and the observed costs, the
underlying model of conduct in the industry. It is not obvious how one can distinguish,
say, collusive conduct from Cournot conduct when the equilibrium price under either
alternative model of conduct is constrained to be the same and equal to the marginal cost
of imports. This situation, for a domestic duopoly, is pictured in the left panel of Figure
5. The observed equilibrium outcome is marked with a “+”, where clearly the imports
constraint binds (since “+” lies on qf + qg = p−1(cI), where the duopolists are labelled
f and g). From the observed constrained equilibrium, it is not possible to tell whether
firms in the industry behave in Cournot fashion (in which case aggregate equilibrium
output in the absence of imports would equal qCf + qCg ) or whether firm behaviour is
more collusive than the Cournot benchmark (in which case the aggregate equilibrium
output in the absence of imports would be lower than qCf + qCg ). The example provided
by Illustrations 1 (monopoly) and 2 (Cournot) above should clarify. In the example,
the cost of imports, in addition to demand and domestic cost conditions, are picked
to be such that under either model of conduct the aggregate equilibrium outcome is
constrained to be the same. Under either the hypothesis of collusion or firms behaving à
la Cournot, aggregate industry output is 100 (imports are zero) and price is 6 (equal to
the marginal cost of imports). Thus, industry outcomes under full collusion and under
Cournot are observationally equivalent in this example in which p(qC) > cI , where qC is
the “unconstrained” Cournot equilibrium industry output (recall qC > qM)26.
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Figure 5: Identifying collusion from Cournot when imports constrain equilibrium prices
under both models of conduct. Left panel: The imports constraint binds at the indus-
try equilibrium marked “+”, which is consistent with either Cournot conduct or more
collusive firm conduct. Right panel: Rejection of Cournot behaviour for firm f : ϕf > 0.
Yet even in the case illustrated — where imports constrain prices not only when
26Had I taken (pM >)cI > p(qC) in the example, imports would not have had bite under Cournot
conduct and thus outcomes under full collusion and Cournot would be distinct.
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behaviour is collusive but also under Cournot — it may be possible to distinguish between
competing hypothesis of conduct, despite industry outcomes being equivalent, if firm-
level quantity data is available (in addition to costs being observed). The point is to
recognise that for a Cournot firm, the general (i.e. allowing for the constraining eﬀect
of imports) pricing condition (9) of Proposition 2 has to hold. That is, for no Cournot
firm can (perceived) marginal revenue exceed marginal cost, otherwise the firm would
optimally expand output, and this holds irrespective of whether the imports constraint
binds or not (since the latter places a lower bound on aggregate domestic output). This
pricing condition can be used with observed marginal cost and the estimated market price
elasticity of demand to test for Cournot behaviour. Under the hypothesis of Cournot
behaviour, one may well observe a firm choosing output to the right of its unconstrained
reaction function, given the (joint) output of its rivals, since imports may be restraining
price at the constrained Cournot equilibrium: here, the Cournot firm would not cut
output in an attempt to raise price above cI , as an unconstrained Cournot firm would
do, since this would only open the door to imports. However, under the hypothesis
of Cournot behaviour, one should not observe a firm choosing output to the left of its
unconstrained reaction function. This is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 5. While
firm g’s behaviour is consistent with Cournot (it does not cut output as a Cournot firm
would do in an unconstrained equilibrium, since the imports constraint is binding), firm
f ’s behaviour is not consistent with Cournot: firm f is restricting output. This translates
into the following test. Rewrite the Cournot pricing condition (9) as an equality:
p(q) +
p(q)
η(q)
qf
q
= ϕf + cf (10)
Proposition 3 (Suﬃcient statistic to reject Cournot behaviour) Under the null of Cournot
behaviour, ϕf ≤ 0. When the imports constraint binds, ϕf < 0 is consistent with Cournot
behaviour. The finding that ϕf > 0 allows one to reject the hypothesis that firm f is
behaving in Cournot fashion, in favour of more collusive behaviour, regardless of whether
the imports constraint binds or not.
As I will argue, there is strong evidence to suggest that outcomes across the diﬀerent
local markets in the Brazilian cement industry can be characterised as follows. The
market price elasticities of demand are estimated to be very low, of the order of -0.5.
Demand across local markets with widely diﬀering market structures (i.e. concentration
indices or number of firms) is consistently inelastic: elastically-supplied imports appear
to restrain prices. Yet consumer prices considerably exceed the marginal cost of even the
least eﬃcient producers serving a given local market. I observe many instances in the
data where the hypothesis of Cournot behaviour on the part of firms in local markets
can be rejected in favour of what appears to be (tacit) market division. The right panel
of Figure 5 depicts a typical local market: a firm with a plant located within this market
will correspond to firm g. It ships more than what it would ship in any constrained or
unconstrained Cournot equilibrium. Other firms with plants located within this given
local market, or with plants located nearby, will correspond to firm f in Figure 5, whose
shipments to this local market fall short of their Cournot best responses. In Section 4.4.2
I show how such a collusive arrangement may be sustained in equilibrium in a spatial
dynamic model where firms meet in diﬀerent markets.
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3 Industry and data
3.1 The cement industry
Cement is a homogeneous good produced largely from limestone and clay in weight pro-
portion of roughly 5 to 1. Described simply, limestone and clay are ground and the
mixture is burned at a very high temperature in a rotary kiln producing cement clinker.
The clinker pellets — once cooled — are then ground and mixed with a retarding agent
(gypsum) and varying types of additives to form diﬀerent formulations of cement27. De-
spite the relative simplicity of the product, the production of cement is capital intensive
and is characterised by substantial economies of scale. Labour basically performs a su-
pervisory role (Norman 1979). The process is also energy intensive, not only due to the
operation of the kiln but also due to the grinding of raw material and clinker28.
The process exhibits a fixed factor production function since factor inputs are not
substitutable. Yet marginal costs do vary across kilns and plants, according to the tech-
nology, capacity, age and fuel employed (Jans and Rosenbaum 1996). The last major
innovation to the production process took place in the 1970s in response to the en-
ergy price shocks. The “wet” process kiln system was replaced by the “dry” process,
which consumes less than half the respective energy (since no heat is needed to evap-
orate water). With the energy crisis in the foreground, firms invested in bigger, more
energy-eﬃcient kilns. Maximum kiln capacity in the four decades leading up to 2000
has increased six-fold to four million tonnes per annum (mtpa) (World Cement 2000)29.
Although equipment suppliers and cement producers work closely together, most innova-
tions seem to originate from the equipment suppliers, and technology can be purchased
oﬀ-the-shelf30.
As cement is a low-value commodity relative to weight, transportation costs may
assume a significant proportion of cost, leading to geographically segmented markets.
Scherer et al (1975, p. 429) list cement as having the second highest freight cost index
for shipments out of 101 US industries. In order to meet dispersed demand, firms may
trade in (production) scale economies for lower transport costs by scattering their plants
27The diﬀerent formulations of cement are substitutes in most types of user applications. While
clinker comprises around 96% of ordinary cement, this proportion can be considerably reduced in other
formulations, such as (blast furnace) slag cement or pozzolanic cement. Usually the supply of these
diﬀerent formulations will depend on the availability of additives (i.e. slag or pozzolane) in the proximity
of the cement plant, such as a steelworks in the case of slag cement. Each type of cement usually needs
to conform to legislation that specifies its (physical and chemical) properties. Thus diﬀerentiation based
on formulation is limited.
28In many regions, such as in the Americas and Europe, the supply of limestone is ubiquitous; the
raw material is thus usually extracted from a quarry located within the plant complex. The setup of a
modern plant with capacity of 1.5 million tonnes per annum (mtpa), including the prospecting rights
over limestone reserves, can require a capital outlay of up to US$300 million (US$200 per tonne of
capacity).
29See Rosenbaum (1989) and Johnson and Parkman (1983) on process and capacity changes in the
US industry.
30“Turn-key” plants may be ordered from suppliers. Research and development (R&D) spending by
the cement producers themselves is limited: operating at the forefront of cement-production technology,
the Japanese producer Taiheiyo (Chichibu Onoda prior to 1998) spends less than 1% of sales revenue
on R&D.
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across markets31.
Demand for cement is essentially driven by the construction industry and is, similarly,
cyclical. In developed markets, shipments are largely made in bulk to ready-mixed
concrete firms and construction firms. By contrast, the lion’s share of the industry’s
production in developing countries is dispatched in bags to resellers (retailers) who sell on
to individuals (“do-it-yourself buyers”), reinforced by the fact that over the past decade
or two many governments in such markets have been scaling down on infrastructure
investments. The demand curve for cement is typically steep since cement makes up
only a moderate part of most construction projects and there are few substitutes.
World demand, estimated at 1620 mt in 2000, has been growing at around 3% p.a.
(International Cement Review 2001). Growth is concentrated in emerging markets while
demand in North America and Western Europe has been growing slowly or is stagnant32.
Over the past 15 years, a significant process of consolidation has been running its course
in the global cement industry. While family-run and state-owned firms have been put
on sale, a few multinational firms have been on a buying spree, aggressively moving into
new markets or expanding in markets where they previously operated. The combined
production share (excluding China) of the world’s six largest firms (C6) in 2000 was
estimated at 35%, up from 23% in 1995 and 14% in 1985.
3.2 The Brazilian cement industry in the 1990s
On the basis of output, Brazil ranks sixth in the league of cement-producing countries,
with output of approximately 40 mtpa in the period 1998 to 2000 (SNIC 200233). As
shown in Figure 6, in 1999 57 active plants were scattered across a geographic area
slightly smaller than that of the US34. This spatial distribution is not even, however, as
consumer markets and thus plants are concentrated along the coastal states, in particular
the relatively wealthy and populated states in the Southeast and South regions of the
country35. States to the northwest of the centre of the country are sparsely populated
and are largely covered with jungle.
In 1999, as also depicted in Figure 6, these 57 plants were owned by 12 firms. The
two largest firms, Votorantim and Grupo João Santos, respectively with nationwide
shipment shares of 41% and 12% in 1999, were both domestically-owned, traditional
family-run businesses. The subsidiaries of the large multinational firms Holcim and
Lafarge followed, with shipment shares of 9% and 8% respectively. As Figure 7 indicates,
this national picture hides a lot of variation at the local, statewide level.
31See Scherer et al (1975) and Newmark (1998). Pre-empting entry may further reduce initial plant
scale (Johnson and Parkman 1983).
32Around 30% of consumption occurs in China, notoriously a producer of low-quality cement in
energy-ineﬃcient, environmentally-unfriendly “backyard” mini cement plants.
33Unless specified otherwise, facts from this section are drawn from reports of the Brazilian cement
industry’s trade association (SNIC), backed up by other sources. See Appendix A.
34With a population corresponding to two-thirds that of the US, cement consumption per capita in
Brazil amounts to 232 kg as compared to 415 kg in the US (SNIC 2002).
35The Federative Republic of Brazil is a federation of 27 states. The coastal states are those running
clockwise from the north-most point of the country — the state of Amapá (AP) — to the south-most
state of Rio Grande do Sul (RS).
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Memo:
Standard Total across
Mean Deviation Maximum Minimum 27 states
Cement consumption in state (kt) 1,483 2,324 11,723 55 40,045
Number of (active) cement plants located within state0 2.1 2.6 11 0 57
Number of cement firms (producers) shipping to state 5.7 2.8 11 1 12
One-firm concentration index in state1 57% 17% 100% 25% 41%
Two-firm concentration index in state1 83% 13% 100% 49% 52%
Four-firm concentration index in state1 97% 6% 100% 77% 70%
Hirschmann-Herfindahl index in state1 4494 1823 10000 1830 2106
% shipments originating from state destined for that state2 60% 22% 100% 14%
% shipments origin. from state destined for that and 92% 9% 100% 70%
bordering states2
Value Added (volume decomposition) in Construction Sector3 475 726 3,431 9 12,352
Land area (x 1000 square kilometres)4 315 370 1,571 6 8,515
Population (m, mid 1999)4 6.1 7.3 35.8 0.3 163.9
Population density (/sq km) 56.9 84.1 339.5 1.2 19.3
Per capita cement consumption in state (kg p.c.) 211 67 353 104 244
Per capita Value Added in Construction Sector3 61 26 108 16 75
0 Of the 57 plants, 7 were grinding-only operations (with clinker being shipped from a nearby plant with integrated facilities)
1 Based on shipments from producers located anywhere to buyers located in a given state
2 Applies only to states from which shipments originate (i.e. states where plants are located)
3 In rescaled constant monetary units
4 Source: Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE)
Figure 7: Variation across 27 states of the Brazilian federation, Summary Statistics
(time-varying figures refer to 1999)
The 1990s saw two distinct periods in the history of the Brazilian cement industry.
Up until mid 1994, a period of very high inflation and lowmacroeconomic growth, cement
consumption was stagnant at around 25 mtpa. With the successful implementation of the
Real economic stabilisation plan in July 1994 (see below), cement consumption resumed
its growth at a rate of 10% p.a., reaching 40 mtpa by 1998-99, pulled by exogenous
growth in the construction sector36. The post-stabilisation phase of the 1990s also saw
a flurry of acquisition activity in the cement industry, with the expansion of incumbents
and the entry of foreign firms which did not previously own assets in Brazil. Compared
to the 12 firms that ran operations by 1999, the industry had consisted of 19 producers
in 1991.
Given the short shelf life of cement, firms produce for immediate consumption. Stocks
at producers amount to approximately one week of sales, with roughly another week of
sales being stocked down the trade. Around 90% of shipments from producer plants to
buyers in consumer markets is carried out by road — as opposed to rail or water. In line
with other developing countries, as mentioned above, around 80% of volume is shipped
in bags to resellers who then sell on to small-scale consumers; only 20% is shipped in
bulk by the industry directly to consumers, usually ready-mixed concrete firms, large
construction firms or producers of construction aggregates.
I now provide a few comments on the 1994 economic stabilisation plan and on the
36As will be discussed shortly, real cement prices also fell in the early days post stabilisation.
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role of imports in the cement industry, given their relevance to the present study.
The July 1994 stabilisation plan The Real economic stabilisation plan, enacted in
July 1994, successfully brought (very high) inflation under control. Between 1991 and
June 1994, the first period covered in this study, inflation as measured by the change in
the General Price Index averaged 26% per month (i.e. prices doubling every quarter).
With the implementation of the stabilisation plan, inflation fell to 22% per annum in
the period July 1994 through December 1995, further falling to 10% per annum in the
six years between 1996 and 2001.
One of the outcomes of the stabilisation plan was its large positive eﬀect on the
level of economic activity. The sharp slowdown in inflation, through the reduction in
“inflationary tax”, represented a reduction in the transfers from the private sector to
the government. In particular, the large mass of consumers among the lower-income
groups who previously had no access to instruments of monetary protection, such as
price-indexed savings accounts, saw a significant rise in real incomes. Given their high
propensity to consume, this boosted the demand for consumer goods — notably food,
clothing and durables — and the demand for housing. Coupled with commercial con-
struction projects resulting from a more favourable investment climate, the demand for
housing led to a significant increase in the activity of the construction sector of the
Brazilian economy, and thus in the demand for cement.
The four years following stabilisation also saw the appreciation of the local currency,
of direct relevance to the competitiveness of cement imports. This period of a strong
local currency abruptly came to an end with the devaluation of January 1999.
The role of imports in Brazil Imported cement (including the intermediate product
clinker) constitutes a small share of domestic consumption. As shown in Figure 8, in the
period 1989 to 2003, this share has amounted to at most 2-3% of consumption across
Brazil, though the trend appears to be rising since the trade liberalising reforms of the
early 1990s (and despite a dip in 1999 and 2000 following the devaluation of the local
currency — see below). This low level stands in stark contrast to the penetration of
imports in the US. Carlsson (2001) reports that “imports represent a substantial and
increasing part of the market in the United States, ranging between 10 and 17 percent
of domestic consumption since 1985” (p. 7). The share of imports in some coastal US
markets is actually as high as 30%37. The presence of imports in Brazil thus pales in
comparison to the US, despite most of its markets being located along (or in proximity
to) an extensive Atlantic coastline.
As this study finds, however, the limited penetration of imports hides their welfare-
enhancing role in restraining domestic prices, curbing the market power of domestic
producers. The trade liberalising reforms of the early 1990s, coupled with the appreci-
ation of the local currency in the four years following stabilisation in mid 1994, opened
37Despite the bulkiness of cement relative to its price, the development of specialised seaborne han-
dling and transportation equipment from the 1970s enabled imports to make their presence felt in
coastal markets. Dumez and Jeunemaître (2000) provide a historical account of the rise of international
trade in cement. On the other hand, in both the US and Brazil, exports account for less than 1% of
domestic production (though in Brazil the current trend is upwards).
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Figure 8: (Oﬃcial) Imports of cement and clinker as a proportion of domestic consump-
tion. Source: SECEX, MDIC. Clinker quantities are adjusted by the author to reflect
usage in the production of cement (assumes 80% of clinker imports used in production
of slag cement, with a 40% clinker content).
the door to the threat posed by the entry of imports. To provide a flavour, Figure 9
depicts the evolution of cement prices in the state of Rio Grande do Sul — where one-firm
and two-firm concentration ratios respectively amounted to 55% and 84% in 1999 — both
in current local currency (the real, R$) and in a currency of foreign trade, proxied by the
US dollar. Domestic cement prices in local currency are highly correlated with the price
of the US dollar in local currency (i.e. the exchange rate), to the extent that despite the
occurrence of large variations in the exchange rate during the period, and thus in the
domestic cement price in local currency, the domestic cement price converted into US
dollars is quite steady since 199538 39. In the cross-section of local markets, one would
38Until January 1999 Brazil had an exchange rate fixed by the government. The local currency
(the real) was floated in January 1999 in the midst of the “Brazil currency crisis”, depreciating by
70% against the US dollar in one month, but later partially receding. Other periods of above-average
exchange-rate instability took place in 2001 (commonly attributed to the Argentina crisis next door)
and in the second half of 2002, with the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the presidential election
late that year. The relatively flat evolution of domestic cement prices in US dollars is consistent with
imports setting a price ceiling of between 6-7 US dollars per bag of cement (this would correspond to
the US-dollar equivalent of cI , as defined in Section 2). The observation that it seems to take domestic
producers between 6-12 months to raise domestic prices back to this ceiling in US dollars upon large
unexpected devaluations in the local currency (i.e. in 1999, in 2001 and in 2002) suggests that raising
domestic prices in local currency is not friction free (perhaps the industry is wary of attracting negative
publicity).
39To provide an example, an equity analyst of an investment bank wrote that “(a)lthough imports
accounted for only 1.6% of the Brazilian total consumption in 1995, reaching 451.3 thousand tons, it
represents a constant threat to domestic producers, pressing down domestic prices and imposing a price
ceiling of US$ 70 per ton” (Zaghen 1997; pp. 24). The author refers to the price “at the coast” as the
exporter’s FOB price plus international insurance and freight, excluding cost upon arrival in Brazil,
such as inland freight, sales taxes and resellers’ markups. Further evidence suggesting concern by
domestic producers as to the threat of imports is provided by their successful lobbying of government in
passing antidumping measures — namely a 23% import tariﬀ — against Venezuelan and Mexican cement
producers in the late 1990s who were starting to make inroads into local markets particularly in the
north and northeast of the country.
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also expect cement prices to be increasing in the market’s distance from the coast. This
is verified to be the case. It is important to add, however, that neither of these two
observations — regarding (i) the correlation of cement prices in local currency and the
exchange rate, and (ii) that prices appear to be increasing in distance — are oﬀered as
proof of the claimed role of imports in restraining prices. While consistent with the
claim, they are also consistent with alternative stories, such as factor prices being set
in hard currency on the world market (fuel oil and diesel?), or with producers incurring
higher transport costs to distribute cement in less densely populated areas. The esti-
mation of a very low market price elasticity of demand in equilibrium, in Section 4.2,
coupled with high price-cost margins and supported by interview evidence, will be the
key element in support of my claim.
3.3 Data available: Plant-to-market cement flows and the con-
struction of marginal cost
A detailed account of the sources and treatment of the data is provided in Appendix A.
Here I oﬀer a short description and briefly discuss how I compute the marginal cost of
each plant in serving each local market.
On the demand side, I observe monthly cement consumption and consumer prices (i.e.
prices set by retailers, also referred to as resellers) across the 27 states in the period 1991
to 2003. I take each state to represent a local market. As demand shifters, I observe
alternative series of economic activity, either in the construction and building sector
or aggregated across sectors of the economy, which I use as proxies for the exogenous
demand for cement40.
The key ingredient on the supply side is the observed breakdown of shipments from
each plant to each of the local markets (states), enabling me to map the flow of cement
from the plant to the consumer. In addition to plant ownership, I observe plant charac-
teristics — e.g. capacity, number of kilns, type of fuel usage, proportion of shipments in
bags as opposed to bulk41 — and local factor prices, such as fuel oil, coal, electricity and
wages. I do not observe freight prices paid by cement producers but I approximate these
by using data on freight prices for agricultural goods collected over the period 1997 to
2003 for thousands of diﬀerent routes across Brazil. The transportation of goods such
as soyabean and maize are reportedly close substitutes in the supply of cement freight
(Soares and Caixeta Filho 1996).
Considering that the technology of cement production is of the fixed coeﬃcients type,
I use engineering estimates, factor prices and plant characteristics to directly calculate
the marginal cost of each plant in serving each market. As I argue in Appendix A,
40This follows from the fact that cement is an input to construction and yet accounts for a small
share of construction budgets. Taking such construction activity to exogenously move the demand
curve for cement is a typical assumption: see, for example, Syverson (2004) who uses construction
sector employment as an exogenous measure of demand in ready-mixed concrete (an industry located
downstream to cement).
41Aggregating across all plants, between 1997 and 1999 81% of shipments were in bags. In terms
of the means of transportation, 91% of shipments were by road. The breakdown of shipments among
diﬀerent buyer channels is also available, with resellers accounting for 76% and ready-mixed concrete
firms accounting for 11%, in this same period.
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Figure 9: Evolution of cement prices in RS state since July 1994. In current local
currency units (R$) per bag and US$ per bag
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these marginal costs are indeed estimated upper bounds to the true marginal costs.
(When I turn to the testing of conduct in Section 4.4, such a bias, however, reinforces
the results.) In view of the fixed-coeﬃcient technology and my understanding of the
industry, I model plant marginal cost as flat in quantity up to capacity. Notice that I
do not observe producer prices, only consumer prices. However, I back out producer
prices assuming competition at the retail (reseller) level and taking into account the
high proportional sales taxes. The assumption of competition among resellers follows
from several field interviews, including interviews with producers’ sales representatives
and resellers. (I also check the robustness of this assumption by, for example, comparing
observed producer prices that I was able to obtain from a subset of producers to the
backed-out producer prices.) This study thus considers the entire supply chain from
the producer of cement (and extractor of the raw material) to the retail consumer,
encompassing the reseller: in addition to plant marginal cost, total plant-to-market
marginal cost consists of plant-to-market freight, sales taxes and the reseller’s mark-up.
Figure 10 depicts cement prices (in units of local currency for the standard 50 kg
bag, at a constant December 1999 level42), cement consumption and exogenous demand
(activity in the construction sector) from January 1991 through December 2003 for
the largest market, the state of São Paulo (SP). The month in which the stabilisation
plan was implemented, July 1994, corresponds to observation (month) 43 in the graphs
(marked by dotted lines). Following the lifting of price controls in November 1991,
prices approximately doubled in the first two years of the pre-stabilisation period I
cover, remaining in the high R$ 14 to R$ 16 / bag range until 1994. In the post-
stabilisation period they gradually declined back to R$ 7 by late 1996, gradually rising
thereafter. The sharp increase in consumption following stabilisation, from a level of
600 mt per month to 1000 mt per month within two years, pulled by a 20% jump in
the level of construction activity, is evident from the graphs. Some factor prices are also
portrayed. It is interesting to note that in the post-stabilisation phase the correlation
between cement prices and the prices of fuel oil and diesel oil (the two major components
of cost, used respectively in the kiln and in freight) is high43. This is expected in view
of (i) my earlier claim (at this point) that imports set a price ceiling for cement and
thus cement prices (in local currency) are highly correlated with the exchange rate,
and (ii) oil is a global commodity and policy in the oil sector from the second half of
the 1990s has prescribed domestic oil prices varying in line with the world price (and
hence with the exchange rate). Though the picture varies across states, if only due to
diﬀerent changes in industry structure and demand conditions, the case for the state of
São Paulo is broadly representative for Brazil as a whole, in addition to accounting for
around one-third of the nation’s cement consumption.
A glance at price-cost margins and the robustness of constructed marginal
cost With respect to firm profitability, Figure 11 shows the evolution of average con-
sumer prices, marginal cost and price-cost margins on the leading firm Votorantim’s
42This is done using an economy-wide General Price Index (GPI). Owing to the high levels of inflation
prevailing in the first 42 months (out of 156) that I consider, particular attention has been paid to the
conversion of current cement prices to constant prices — see Appendix A. Factor prices are similarly
converted. In contrast, Figure 9 presents current prices (albeit for another state).
43From July 1994, correlation coeﬃcients (all highly significant) are as follows: 0.72 between cement
prices and the (US dollar) exchange rate; 0.86 between cement prices and the price of fuel oil; 0.77
between the price of fuel oil and the exchange rate.
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Figure 11: Evolution of consumer prices, marginal costs and price-cost margins on Vo-
torantim’s sales. Averaged across all states. In constant Reais per bag (at December
1999 values).
actual sales across Brazil, in constant local currency units per bag. (Figure 18 in the
Appendix breaks this figure down into figures for each of the 25 states where Votoran-
tim is present.) Prices and marginal cost have been increasing since late 1996, the latter
owing chiefly to increases in the price of fuel oil and diesel (freight) and the fact that
sales taxes are proportional to prices — recall that cost relates to the entire supply chain,
including freight, sales taxes and the reseller’s cost. The picture is similar across firms.
In sum, the industry wields considerable market power, despite the threat of imports.
Across producers, across states and over time, the price-cost margin as a proportion of
the consumer price lies in the region of 25-45% (equivalent to 40-65% as a proportion of
the producer price net of sales tax).
I conduct two robustness checks of the calculated marginal costs and the resulting
price-cost margins (for further details, see Appendix A). The first check consists of
comparing my measures of price-cost margins as a percentage of net producer sales (i.e.
net of sales taxes) to reported EBITDA (earnings before income tax and depreciation
allowance, also known as operating cash flow) as a percentage of net sales for the firm
Cimpor, over the period 1998 to 2003. (This firm, which bought its way into Brazil
in 1997, is listed on the Lisbon stock exchange, and fortunately reports its financial
results broken out by country of operation and line of business.) The time series fit
between constructed and reported figures is good. For example, I estimate Cimpor’s
average price-cost margins as a percentage of net producer sales rising from around
47% in 2000 to 56% in 2002. Cimpor reports a similar rise in this period, from 44% to
55%. If anything, my calculated price-cost margins are slightly higher than the EBITDA
figures Cimpor reports. This is to be expected, for while my cost estimates include only
(constant) marginal cost, Cimpor’s EBITDA figures are net of other costs such as plant
overhead and sales and administrative expenses. Indeed, my price-cost margins appear
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to be conservative (on the low side), as flagged above. The second check is based on
accounting data sampled among establishments in the cement industry on an annual
basis by the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE) as part of their
Annual Industry Survey (PIA) series. Producers’ average accounting gross margin (Net
Sales minus Cost of Goods Sold) as a percentage of net sales hovers around 50% during
the 1990s; further, its variation is in line with the observed fall in prices beginning in
1992 and the rise in prices commencing in 1997. (Note that the Cost of Goods Sold does
not include freight but it includes depreciation.)
A final word on capacity utilisation Throughout the time period, capacity con-
siderably exceeds production, including the three years post stabilisation of steep con-
sumption growth (1995 to 1997), although the slack is lower. Capacity utilisation hovers
around an average 65%. The reader is referred to Appendix A for details (and a discus-
sion of a strategic role for capacity is provided in 4.4.2).
4 Inferring demand and conduct in the Brazilian ce-
ment industry
4.1 A “road map”
Having laid out the theoretical framework and provided an outline of the industry and
the data, this Section turns to the empirical application. Section 4.2 begins by estimating
demand in each local market (state). The market price elasticities of demand are esti-
mated to be very low, of the order of -0.5. Demand across local markets is consistently
inelastic at the equilibrium, including local markets where the one-firm concentration
ratio is as high as 80%. Recall that observed (constructed) price-cost margins are high
in equilibrium. I argue that the reason why the industry, with its considerable pricing
power, does not further raise prices (and further restrict output) is that the competitive
fringe of imports sets a price ceiling which binds at the industry equilibrium. As such,
while the market elasticity is low (-0.5), the price elasticity of the demand that the
domestic industry faces is much higher: the equilibrium lies at the kink in the residual
demand curve facing the domestic oligopoly (recall the right panel of Figure 1 in the
theoretical framework developed earlier).
I have shown that when the threat of entry constrains prices, joint inference of
conduct and cost from the estimation of a static pricing equation will not be consistent.
The lack of price variation as demand moves exogenously will lead to the overestimation
of competition; econometrically, the exogenous demand variables will be correlated with
the error in the misspecified pricing equation. This is what Section 4.3 shows with
regard to the industry at hand. I assume costs are not known and proceed to estimating
a market-level pricing equation, instrumenting with exogenous demand. The conduct
parameter is estimated to be close to zero and costs are estimated to be close to prices,
wrongly suggesting that the outcomes in the Brazilian cement industry are competitive.
The negative bias in the estimated price-cost margins is severe in light of the high price-
cost margins I measure directly, as presented earlier in Section 3.3.
30
Having rejected competitive conduct based on the known price-cost margins, Section
4.4 delves deeper into the pattern of conduct in the industry, taking into account the
constraint posed by imports on industry outcomes. I use the test of Proposition 3, which
is based on direct measures of costs and the observed firm-level quantity data (i.e. the
flow of cement from plants to local markets), to show that conduct is considerably more
collusive than the Cournot benchmark. Market outcomes are characteristic of (tacit)
market division, and this can be identified despite the threat of imports restraining prices.
Finally, in Section 4.4.2 I show how such an arrangement may be sustained in equilibrium
in a context where firms meet in diﬀerent markets. Inspired by the Brazilian cement
industry, I provide examples of simple dynamic games which give rise to such collusive
behaviour in equilibrium.
4.2 Demand
There are L (geographic) markets (identified with states of the Brazilian federation),
indexed by l = 1, ..., L. Scattered across these L markets are I plants, indexed by
i = 1, ..., I.44 Let i = 0 index the aggregate fringe of foreign suppliers. The flow of
cement for consumption can be summarised in a set of (I +1)×L matrices, one matrix
for every time period t, where element qilt denotes the quantity of cement shipped by
plant i for consumption in market l in that time period. Let qlt denote total shipments
to market l in period t, i.e. consumption; then qlt =
PI
i=0 qilt. The demand function in
each market l can then be written:
qlt = D(plt, Ylt, αl, dlt) (11)
where plt is the price of cement to the consumer, Ylt are exogenous variables shifting
demand (e.g. output in the construction and building sector), αl are market-specific
parameters to be estimated and dlt is an econometric error term. (Demand function
D(.) is the inverse of the inverse demand function p(.) considered in the theoretical
framework, i.e. D(.) = p−1(.).)
Estimation of (11) must deal with the (potential) endogeneity of prices. The choice
of instruments will depend on whether imports restrain domestic prices at the industry
equilibrium (i.e. whether the imports constraint binds, in which case prices are given by
the marginal cost of imports cI , as in Figure 5), which in turn depends on the behaviour
of domestic firms45. There are therefore two situations to consider.
Identification 1: Imports restrain domestic prices at the industry equilibrium
In practice, due to the presence of frictions, cement prices will not be exactly equal to
cI . Prices and cI should be highly correlated however. As mentioned in Section 2 (recall
the right panel of Figure 1), fluctuations in the marginal cost of imports allow one to
trace out the demand curve (assuming cI does not rise to the extent where imports
no longer have bite). The marginal cost of imports is a function of factors such as
44Not all plants are active (in the sense that cement is shipped from them) in each time period t; in
a given time period, some plants may be yet to enter (or reenter), while others may have exited.
45Recall that in the case of full collusion and pM ≥ cI , as in the right panel of Figure 1, the equilibrium
price is p = cI . Likewise, in the case of Cournot, imports will have bite if the aggregate Cournot output
in the absence of imports falls short of p−1(cI) — see footnote 24 and the right panel of Figure 4.
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the exchange rate, world fuel prices (used in the production of clinker abroad and in
the international transport of cement), tariﬀs and port handling charges, and domestic
freight to the consumer (the latter being highly correlated with the domestic price of
diesel oil). Observed factors such as the exchange rate, world fuel prices and domestic
diesel oil prices (all in local currency in constant terms) can then be used as instruments
for prices in the estimation of (11) (under the identifying assumption that these factors
are not correlated with the unobserved market-specific demand shocks dlt).
To the extent that the “frictions component” of cement prices — i.e. the part of prices
not determined by the marginal cost of imports cI — is orthogonal to the unobserved
demand shocks across local markets, prices can be treated as predetermined and (11)
can be estimated by OLS46.
Identification 2: Imports do not restrain domestic prices at the industry
equilibrium When imports do not restrain domestic prices, traditional cost-shifters
may be used to instrument for cement prices. These include factor prices (i.e. prices
of kiln fuel such as fuel oil and coal, electricity prices which determine the cost of
grinding, the price of diesel oil which drives the cost of freight, and wages, the latter also
impacting freight in addition to the cost of production) and other supply-shifters such
as plant capacity, to the extent that changes to scale impact (flat) marginal cost47.
4.2.1 Demand specification
I begin by specifying the market-level demand function (11) in loglinear form as:
log qlt = α1l + α2l Ylt + α3l log plt + α4l Ylt log plt + dlt (12)
For each market there are 156 monthly observations, from January 1991 to December
2003. Given the quarterly seasonality of sales, three quarterly dummies — not shown in
(12) — are included. The inclusion of an interaction term between (log) price and the
exogenous demand variable (construction and building activity), Ylt log plt, allows the
demand curve in logs to rotate — in addition to shift, through the level term Ylt — as
exogenous demand varies.
By the earlier discussion, (12) is estimated, for each local market, by (I) OLS, (II)
2SLS using the exchange rate and other prices relevant to the marginal cost of imports
(such as world oil prices and local diesel oil prices) as instruments (all in constant local
currency), and (III) 2SLS using factor prices as instruments. These three sets of results
are depicted in Figure 12 for the state of São Paulo (SP), denoted respectively as “OLS”,
46The model I have in mind when imports restrain domestic prices is as follows. Cement prices p are
determined by the marginal cost of imports cI and a frictions component ζ, i.e. p = cI + ζ. As for cI ,
as the econometrician I observe some cost drivers V 1 but not others V 2, where cI = V 1κ + V 2φ, and
κ and φ are parameters. Under the identifying assumption that E(V 1d) = 0, where d captures the
unobserved demand shocks in (11), V 1 (e.g. the exchange rate) can be used to instrument for prices in
the estimation of (11). In addition, if E(ζd) = 0 (and of course E(V 2d) = 0 as well), demand equation
(11) can be estimated consistently by OLS.
47Other instruments can be used as a robustness check, such as Hausmann-type instruments (prices
of cement in other local markets) or lagged prices or first diﬀerences.
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“IV imports bite” and “IV imports no bite”48. (I illustrate using results for the state
of SP, as this is the largest market, accounting for 29% of national cement consump-
tion in 1999; as shown below, however, results across states follows a common pattern.)
Most estimated coeﬃcients are significantly diﬀerent from zero, many at the 1% level
of significance. The interaction term is found to be negative and highly significant: the
demand curve (in logs) rotates anticlockwise as exogenous demand expands49. Each fit-
ted equation is evaluated at two diﬀerent values for the exogenous demand variable: at
the mean for the pre-stabilisation (high inflation) phase, Y¯SP,pre = 2883, from January
1991 through June 1994 (42 observations), and at the mean for the post-stabilisation
(low inflation) phase, Y¯SP,post = 3338, from July 1994 through December 2003 (114 ob-
servations). The (average) market price elasticity of demand during the pre-stabilisation
phase amounts to (an inelastic)−0.17, rising to−0.33 during the post-stabilisation phase
(see the respective coeﬃcients on log price in column (II), respectively αˆ3SP + αˆ
4
SP Y¯SP,pre
and αˆ3SP + αˆ4SP Y¯SP,post). Thus, as prices in the economy stabilise and an average 16%
exogenous increase in the demand for cement occurs, the price elasticity seems to double
from around −0.2 to around −0.4. Clearly, a formal test that the price elasticity has
increased is equivalent to verifying that the coeﬃcient on the interaction term is signifi-
cantly negative. This is so: the p-value for this (one-tailed) test is 1.5%. Importantly, to
check the robustness of the low elasticity I repeat regressions (II) and (III) using only the
114 observations from the post-stabilisation subsample (July 1994 on). This confirms a
low elasticity of −0.4 (results are not shown). Figure 13 plots the fitted demand curve
for the pre- and post-stabilisation phases (i.e. evaluated at the respective means Y¯SP,pre
and Y¯SP,post), indicating that as stabilisation took place and exogenous demand grew,
the demand curve shifted out and rotated anticlockwise. In addition to the state of São
Paulo (SP), similar plots are drawn for the three next largest markets, the states of Mi-
nas Gerais (MG), Rio de Janeiro (RJ ) and Bahia (BA). These suggest that this pattern
may be typical across states, as I argue after considering some specification tests.
Specification tests I test for the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
using diagnostic tests such as Pagan and Hall (1983). While under OLS I can clearly re-
ject homoskedasticity, I can no longer reject homoskedasticity under 2SLS. In any case, I
choose to allow for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation by calculating heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors (1-lag Newey-West errors). As for the
choice of instruments, I verify the overidentifying restrictions in specifications (II) and
(III) using diﬀerent tests such as those based on Hansen’s J statistic or variations of
the Sargan statistic (see Wooldridge 2002, or Baum, Schaﬀer and Stillman 2003). In
both specifications (II) and (III), I can reject the null that the set of instruments is
orthogonal to the error term, casting doubt on the validity of the set of instruments,
despite the finite sample properties of such statistics suggesting that the test results
should be interpreted with caution. (Further, from the structural model one would not
expect that market-specific demand shocks be correlated with the instruments, such as
48Standard errors are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust (1-lag Newey-West errors). Es-
timates for the three quarterly dummies are not shown, but are usually significantly negative in the
first quarter, significantly negative or insignificant in the second quarter, and insignificantly negative,
insignificant or significantly positive in the third quarter.
49Estimation of specification (11) excluding the interaction term renders a significantly positive coef-
ficient on the level of exogenous demand, as expected (results are not shown).
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(I) (II) (III) (II B) (III B)
OLS IV IV IV subset IV subset
imports bite imports no bite imports bite imports no bite
No. obs. 156 156 156 156 156
R2 0.840
Intercept coef 2.241 * 2.828 ** 2.439 * 0.212 0.729
s.e. (1.202) (1.210) (1.236) (1.357) (1.333)
Exog. demand coef 0.00159 *** 0.00141 *** 0.00152 *** 0.00225 *** 0.00203 ***
s.e. (0.00038) (0.00039) (0.00039) (0.00043) (0.00042)
Log Price coef 1.093 ** 0.852 * 1.003 * 1.954 *** 1.702 ***
s.e. (0.498) (0.504) (0.514) (0.564) (0.554)
Interaction coef -0.000428 *** -0.000355 ** -0.000396 ** -0.000709 *** -0.000607 ***
s.e. (0.000160) (0.000163) (0.000166) (0.000181) (0.000176)
Quarterly dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Evaluating at the mean of exogenous demand pre-stabilisation:
2,883
Intercept coef 6.825 *** 6.898 *** 6.815 *** 6.699 *** 6.594 ***
s.e. (0.143) (0.144) (0.145) (0.155) (0.167)
Log Price coef -0.142 ** -0.171 *** -0.138 ** -0.091 -0.048
s.e. (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.060) (0.065)
Evaluating at the mean of exogenous demand post-stabilisation:
3,338 16% growth versus pre-stabilisation phase
Intercept coef 7.549 *** 7.541 *** 7.507 *** 7.724 *** 7.521 ***
s.e. (0.129) (0.136) (0.135) (0.142) (0.141)
Log Price coef -0.337 *** -0.333 *** -0.318 *** -0.414 *** -0.325 ***
s.e. (0.058) (0.060) (0.060) (0.063) (0.062)
Test of overidentifying restrictions Fail Fail Pass Pass
Note: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors (Newey-West 1 lag)
          ***  Significant(ly different from zero) at the 1% level; **  Significant at the 5% level; *  Significant at the 10% level
          Dependent variable is Log Consumption
          Quarterly dummy variables for quarters 1, 2 and 3 are included but estimates are not shown
Figure 12: Demand estimates for the state of SP
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Figure 13: Fitted demand curves for the four largest markets. (Log) Price against (Log)
Consumption. Evaluated at the respective means of exogenous demand Y for the pre-
and post-stabilisation phases
the exchange rate and the price of diesel oil.) To check the extent to which overiden-
tification may be driving eﬃciency in the estimation at the expense of consistency, I
reestimate specifications (II) and (III) in each case using only a subset of the initial set
of instruments such that the validity of instruments can no longer be rejected. This is
shown in Figure 12 as regressions (II B) and (III B) respectively. Comparing estimates
for (II B) against those for (II), for example, the estimated elasticities are similar. I also
test for the endogeneity of prices (and the interaction term) using endogeneity tests à
la Durbin-Wu-Hausman (Wooldridge 2002). Under specifications (II) and (III), using
the initial set of instruments for each specification, I cannot reject the null hypothesis
that prices are orthogonal to the error, lending some credibility to the OLS estimates,
as explained earlier. However, repeating these tests under specifications (II B) and (III
B), using only a subset of the instruments, I can reject the null of orthogonality in some
instances, but not all. Finally, given the eﬃciency of GMM under heteroskedasticity, I
reestimate specifications (II) and (III) (and their counterparts which use a subset of the
initial number of moment conditions) using GMM. Results — not shown — are similar.
Results by state Figure 14 summarises results across states, from regression (II)
using the full sample (pre- and post-stabilisation phases). At first glance, the picture is
mixed when compared to the results just described for the state of SP. The estimated
price elasticity for 3 out of the 27 states is positive (evaluating at the mean for exogenous
demand during the post-stabilisation phase), 2 of which significantly so, suggesting that
for these states the demand curve slopes upward! The estimated coeﬃcient for the
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interaction term is positive for 9 out of the 27 states (4 of which significantly so),
suggesting that as exogenous demand expands in the post-stabilisation phase — and
indeed it does expand in every one of the 27 states — the demand curve for these states
rotates clockwise. The estimates for these states stand in contrast to the results obtained
for the state of SP, which I claimed represented a typical pattern across states. Upon
closer inspection, however, one notices that these “outlier” states are mostly located
to the northwest of the centre of the country, an area which is sparsely populated and
largely covered in jungle. Together they account for 60% of Brazil’s land area but only
13% of its population and only 11% of its cement consumption in 1999 (see Figure 6). It
is thus reasonable to believe that the measurement error associated with data collected
for these states is large50. I thus choose to drop these 10 states from the analysis,
segregating their estimates at the bottom of Figure 14.
For the remaining 17 states, the pattern is similar and consistent with the results
reported for the state of SP. Evaluating exogenous demand at its mean annual value in
the post-stabilisation phase, the price elasticity of demand is negative for all 17 states,
and significant at the 1% level in 15 states. Price elasticities in the post-stabilisation
phase vary from a minimum (in absolute) of −0.14 to a maximum of −0.72, with a mean
of −0.41 and a standard deviation of 0.1451. It is worth pointing out that elasticities
are low even in states where the supply of cement is highly concentrated, such as the
state of Santa Catarina (SC ), where the one-firm concentration ratio is 78% (in 1999).
Evaluating exogenous demand at its mean value in the pre-stabilisation phase, price
elasticities are negative in 16 out of 17 states, 9 of which are significant at the 10% level
or higher. In the pre-stabilisation phase the mean price elasticity is lower: −0.22.52
50Indeed the leading global market research and data collection firm, ACNielsen, well-known to
marketing professionals in consumer goods industries, and with over 30 years of experience in Brazil,
does not audit any of these “outlier” states, to the northwest of the centre, except for the Federal
District (DF ) and the state of Goiás (GO). I also choose to drop DF because it consists essentially of
a city, the federal capital Brasília, with a large population of 2m and two cement plants, embedded at
the corner of the state of GO, near to the borders of the states of MG and BA, over which product
must flow which I do not observe. For this reason the measurement error associated with consumption
figures for DF may be large. I also drop GO on the basis of probable measurement error: in addition to
its low population density, until 1988 the states of GO and TO comprised one single state, previously
known as Goiás, when in 1988 the northern half of the state broke away to form the state of Tocantins
(TO).
51Other studies of cement have found low market price elasticities in equilibrium. For example,
Röller and Steen (2002) find an average −0.46 for Norway (treating it as a single market) using yearly
observations between 1955 and 1968. Also using yearly observations, over 25 years up to 1989, Jans
and Rosenbaum (1996) report an average fitted elasticity of −0.81 across 25 regional US markets. It
is conceivable that in these markets imports have also been restraining the prices set by the domestic
oligopolies. The explanation commonly advanced behind such inelastic demand is that cement accounts
for a low share of construction budgets and it has few substitutes (except in highway construction, where
asphalt is a substitute). Yet while helping to explain the steepness of the inverse demand curve, this
does not explain the steepness at the equilibrium. One must still explain why an industry, facing such
inelastic demand at the market price, does not cut output in an attempt to raise prices and thus move
up along the demand curve to a point where demand is more elastic. To rationalise why the industry
seeing such inelastic demand does not restrict output, one would expect either weak pricing power (e.g.
competition or low concentration, such that the elasticity facing individual producers is higher than the
aggregate elasticity) or some dynamic story, such as the threat of entry restraining prices.
52Given that exogenous demand — activity in the construction and building sector — rises on average in
every state concurrent with stabilisation, this finding that the price elasticity of demand also increases
is equivalent to estimating a negative coeﬃcient for the interaction term. Indeed the fitted interaction
coeﬃcient is negative in 13 out of the 17 states, in 8 of which at the 5% level of significance. See footnote
89 for one possible explanation behind the increase in elasticity upon stabilisation.
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Cement
consumption
State in 1999 (kt) coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
20 SP 11,723 -0.000355 (0.000163) ** -0.171 (0.056) *** -0.333 (0.060) ***
17 MG 5,090 -0.001067 (0.000235) *** -0.147 (0.063) ** -0.549 (0.059) ***
19 RJ 3,809 -0.002660 (0.000575) *** -0.137 (0.059) ** -0.481 (0.057) ***
16 BA 2,461 -0.003048 (0.000815) *** -0.027 (0.065) -0.361 (0.079) ***
21 PR 2,321 -0.001015 (0.000647) -0.137 (0.087) -0.278 (0.088) ***
23 RS 2,221 -0.001057 (0.000762) -0.228 (0.037) *** -0.379 (0.097) ***
22 SC 1,648 -0.003488 (0.002647) 0.020 (0.091) -0.180 (0.095) *
13 PE 1,225 -0.003389 (0.001675) ** -0.285 (0.093) *** -0.469 (0.061) ***
10 CE 1,139 -0.005347 (0.001662) *** -0.142 (0.125) -0.562 (0.113) ***
18 ES 837 -0.003029 (0.002317) -0.370 (0.078) *** -0.480 (0.068) ***
8 MA 765 -0.020114 (0.007056) *** -0.097 (0.187) -0.564 (0.126) ***
12 PB 565 -0.036712 (0.007397) *** -0.123 (0.081) -0.715 (0.111) ***
11 RN 531 -0.005411 (0.004692) -0.145 (0.146) -0.300 (0.078) ***
25 MS 454 0.000899 (0.004419) -0.431 (0.047) *** -0.415 (0.071) ***
14 AL 384 0.080309 (0.030990) ** -0.475 (0.127) *** -0.351 (0.112) ***
9 PI 379 0.015324 (0.012214) -0.657 (0.272) ** -0.330 (0.103) ***
15 SE 282 0.003937 (0.020794) -0.145 (0.136) -0.136 (0.099)
Memo: States to the northwest of the centre of the country, mostly sparsely populated
26 GO 1,152 0.002590 (0.002127) -0.163 (0.053) *** -0.040 (0.079)
5 PA 802 0.000622 (0.004211) -0.369 (0.144) ** -0.318 (0.246)
27 DF 694 -0.038925 (0.015687) ** 0.014 (0.074) -0.153 (0.078) *
24 MT 540 0.012129 (0.004524) *** -0.300 (0.100) *** 0.210 (0.121) *
3 AM 327 -0.023351 (0.007191) *** 0.107 (0.101) -0.611 (0.166) ***
7 TO 282 0.000000 (0.000000) -1.052 (0.218) *** -1.052 (0.218) ***
1 RO 217 -0.028803 (0.020138) -0.152 (0.440) -1.194 (0.344) ***
6 AP 78 0.357032 (0.192129) * 0.126 (0.315) 0.744 (0.215) ***
4 RR 66 1.217022 (0.340927) *** -1.366 (0.307) *** 0.190 (0.305)
2 AC 55 -0.222964 (0.109062) ** -1.406 (0.437) *** -2.673 (0.352) ***
Note: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors (Newey-West 1 lag)
          ***  Significant(ly different from zero) at the 1% level; **  Significant at the 5% level; *  Significant at the 10% level
(II)
IV-imports bite
mean pre-stabilisationInteraction mean post-stabilisation
Log Price: Y  evaluated at
Figure 14: Demand estimates by state, Summary
Summary of demand and robustness checks (see Appendix B) Regardless of
the type of price instruments employed (or using prices themselves, under OLS), which
depends on whether one accepts that imports restrain domestic prices at the industry
equilibrium, I estimate very low market price elasticities of demand, of the order of
-0.5. In Appendix B I consider further robustness checks: (i) estimating the state-level
demand equations simultaneously, allowing the unobserved demand shocks across states
to be correlated; (ii) using fixed eﬀects instrumental-variables panel data estimation,
specifying each state as a unit and calculating clustered standard errors (i.e. clustering
the observations pertaining to a given state). Notice that, given the vastly larger number
of observations (156 months × 17 states as opposed to 156 months in each state-level
estimation above), this specification increases eﬃciency at the expense of cross-unit
restrictions; (iii) fitting alternative functional forms, such as semi-log-linear and linear,
as opposed to the log-linear specification (12); (iv) reversing the dependent variable; (v)
considering the possibility that instruments are weak; and (vi) considering a dynamic
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demand function. The overall conclusion arising from these checks is that this section’s
finding — that demand is inelastic (of the order of -0.5) at the equilibrium in each local
market — is robust.
4.3 Estimation of a static pricing equation: inconsistent cost
and conduct estimates
I now ignore the constraint posed by imports on the prices set by the domestic oligopoly.
Based on the estimates of demand of Section 4.2, and assuming costs are not known,
I proceed to estimating a pricing equation such as (3), as is standard in the empirical
literature on market power53. I then compare the estimates for cost and conduct, sum-
marised in the estimated elasticity-adjusted price-cost mark-ups (2), to the observed
(constructed) values. I show that the estimation exercise considerably overestimates
the degree of competition and the marginal cost, incorrectly suggesting that price-cost
margins in the Brazilian cement industry are centred around zero.
I begin by specifying the (standard) structural econometric model. Recall the market-
level demand function (11) defined at the beginning of Section 4.2 and write its inverse
(D−1(.) = p(.)) as
plt = p(qlt, Ylt, αl, dlt)
Define plant i’s costs as
Cit = C(qit,qit,Wit, Zit, β, εsit)
where qit :=
PL
l=1 qilt denotes plant i’s shipments aggregated across markets l (equal
to production), Wit are the prices it pays for its factors, and Zit are other exogenous
variables that shift supply. Note that costs by plant will not only depend on the plant’s
total shipments qit but also on the destination of these shipments qit := (qi1t, qi2t, ..., qiLt),
owing to market-specific factors such as freight. β is a vector of common parameters
to be estimated and εsit is a plant-specific error. The I plants are owned by F firms,
indexed by f = 1, ..., F . Define Oft as the set of plants owned by firm f in month t. In
period t firm f solves
max
qilt|i∈Oft,∀l
LX
l=1
⎡
⎣p(qlt, .)
⎛
⎝X
i∈Oft
qilt
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦−
X
i∈Oft
C(qit,qit, .)
In words, firm f sets shipments from each plant it owns to each market to maximise its
profits, which correspond to the diﬀerence between the sum of revenues across markets
and the sum of costs across plants. Denote the derivatives of the (inverse) demand and
cost functions with respect to qlt and qilt respectively as p1(.) and c(.). Following Bres-
nahan (1989), the first-order condition for multi-plant firm f with regard to shipments
from its plant i ∈ Oft to market l, i.e. qilt, yields a pricing equation for each plant i -
market l pair:
plt + p1(qlt, Ylt, αl, dlt)qltθflt ≤ c(qit,qit,Wit, Zit, β, εsit)
53Since I ignore that the true model is (4) and that the estimated model is thus (5) with E(Y 0ξs) < 0,
here I refer to the pricing equation error as εs and not ξs, as a researcher overlooking the price-
constraining eﬀect of imports would do, thinking that he is specifying (3) with E(Y 0εs) = 0.
38
The pricing equation can be written as an equality when qilt > 0 (i.e. an interior solu-
tion). Recall from the earlier discussion of Section 2.2 that this specification encompasses
alternative models of conduct. At the two extremes, θflt = 1 captures full collusion while
θflt = 0 reflects price-taking behaviour (competition); a θflt equal to firm f ’s market
share, i.e. θflt = sflt :=
?
i∈Oft qilt
qlt
corresponds to firm f behaving as a Cournot player.
For qilt > 0 and specifying an additive econometric pricing error, one may implement
this pricing equation as
plt = −θflt
plt
ηlt
+ c(qit,qit,Wit, Zit, β) + εsilt (13)
(recall η is the market price elasticity of demand).
In what follows, I present estimation results corresponding to a market-level counter-
part to the plant-level pricing equation (13). As mentioned in footnote 12, the market-
level equation should be viewed as an average across plants’ pricing equations54. In
view of the fixed-coeﬃcient technology of production, I specify average market marginal
cost c as being linear in average market factor prices Wlt (namely fuel oil, coal, elec-
tricity, labour and freight55) and flat in quantity (though in other specifications I have
also allowed average market marginal cost to vary in quantity). I allow cost to shift
according to the average size and age of the plants shipping into the market (weighted
by shipments), Zlt (e.g. marginal cost in a market served by high-capacity plants should
be lower). (Finally, a dummy is included to account for price controls in the first ten
months of 1991: this supply-shifter may be viewed as an additional element of Zlt.) The
market-level pricing equation is thus
plt = −θl
plt
ηˆlt
+Wltβ1 + Zltβ2 + νl + εslt (14)
where νl is a market-specific fixed eﬀect and the market-specific conduct parameter
θl is time-invariant (other specifications I have fitted allow θl to vary over time, such
as upon stabilisation). Equation (14) is fitted using fixed-eﬀects instrumental variables
panel data estimation, where the endogenous regressor pltηˆlt is instrumented using excluded
exogenous demand variables Ylt, and thus the orthogonality condition E(Y 0εs) = 0 is
imposed. Since the elasticity ηˆlt is an estimate based on the demand estimates from
Section 4.2, I compute bootstrapped (heteroskedasticity-robust) standard errors (with
1000 repetitions, reestimating demand in the first stage for each bootstrap sample) for
the fitted coeﬃcients θˆl and βˆ (and νˆ l). Notice that though knowledge of the nature of
technology is used when specifying marginal cost to be linear in factor prices, marginal
54Owing to the lack of firm-level data, most empirical IO studies have no choice but to estimate a
market-level equation. Though I have the luxury of observing plant-level data, I here choose to follow
suit to simplify the exposition. Importantly, I have estimated a plant-level pricing equation and have
ensured robustness of the conclusions I derive from what follows.
55The average factor price, say that of electricity, for a given market is calculated as the average price
of that factor paid by the plants sourcing that market (weighted by the sourcing plants’ shipments to
that market). The price eﬀect of substitute kiln fuels (fuel oil and coal) are interactions of the average
price of the fuel and the average use of that fuel in the production of cement shipped to the market
(i.e. given the location of coal mines in the South of the country, coal prices have a larger eﬀect on
the cost of cement plants located in the South). A market’s average plant-to-market freight price is
modelled as the interaction of the average distance to market across the plants sourcing that market
(again weighted by shipments) and a transport price index (based heavily on the price of diesel oil).
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cost is assumed to be unknown: this is estimated from the observed supply-shifters
(Wlt, Zlt) and the estimates of the fixed coeﬃcients (β, ν) as Wltβˆ
1
+ Zltβˆ
2
+ νˆ l.
Figure 15 reports estimation results. The comments that follow refer to estimation
(I), based on the entire period, though estimates based only on observations from the
post-stabilisation period (i.e. from July 1994) are provided to demonstrate robustness of
the conclusion that follows. The coeﬃcients on the prices of fuel oil, coal, electricity and
freight are all positive and significant. The coeﬃcient on the average size (age) of plants
is negative (positive), as expected, though not significant. On the other hand, con-
trary to intuition, the price of labour is significantly negative56. The price-cost margins
are estimated to be very low; these are pictured in Figure 16, along with 95% confi-
dence intervals, for the state of Rio de Janeiro (RJ), for example. The dual to these
cost estimates are the low estimated conduct parameters θˆl, not significantly diﬀerent
from 0, suggesting competition57. For the state of RJ, a θˆ of 0.0079 would correspond
to the equilibrium price-cost margins of a static symmetric 130-firm Cournot industry
(1/0.0079). Dividing θˆRJ by the (negative of the) estimated elasticity ηˆRJ of −0.48 from
Figure 14, the estimated (average) price-cost margin as a proportion of price is only
0.0079/0.48 ≈ 1.6% (recall expression (2)).
It is clear from our knowledge of marginal cost and price-cost margins in the industry
that these estimates are inconsistent. Figure 16 also depicts the (much higher) direct
measures of (average) price-cost margins on sales to the state of RJ. What lies behind
the market price elasticities of demand of the order of only -0.5 in equilibrium, is not
the prevalence of competition, as suggested by θˆ, but the constraining eﬀect of imports
on prices at the industry equilibrium. Econometrically, as argued in Section 2.2, this
constrained equilibrium translates into the correlation between the exogenous demand
variables being used to instrument pricing equation (14) and its residual. The identifying
assumption’s failure to hold results in the overestimation of the degree of competition.
(Indeed, the p-values of overidentification tests à la Sargan and Hansen — where the null
is that the set of instruments is valid — is 0.0000 for any overidentifying set.) The finding
that the coeﬃcients on factor prices and other supply-shifters are of the expected sign
(bar wages) and mostly significant may lead one to misjudge that the econometric model
is appropriately specified. But the estimated coeﬃcients are only picking up the expected
correlation between cement prices and factor prices. They are not consistent estimates
of the structural cost parameters β. The general point is that because the threat of entry
is not observed, it is only natural that a researcher overlook its role in restraining prices,
inadvertently taking the lack of price variation to exogenous movements in demand as
evidence in the direction of price-taking behaviour and zero price-cost margins58.
56Interestingly, this counter-intuitive estimate is also obtained by Jans and Rosenbaum (1996), who
estimate a market-level structural model of the US cement industry (it must be pointed out that, despite
their penetration into US markets, a price-constraining role for imports is not considered in Jans and
Rosenbaum’s model). In attempting to explain the negative coeﬃcient on wages, the authors cite Clark
(1980), who suggests that plants that pay higher wages may do so because their labour force is more
productive (and possibly more unionised, as Clark finds the more productive US cement plants to be).
57It is worth mentioning that the estimated confidence intervals for θˆl vary considerably according to
the specification (such as the functional form for demand), though low (absolute) values do seem to be
a robust result.
58A comment on this particular industry where conditions (i.e. the steepness of the market demand
curve and the marginal cost of imports) are such that demand is so inelastic at the equilibrium. Assume
one does not realise that the imports constraint binds at the equilibrium and thus considers the class of
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coef bootstrap s.e. coef bootstrap s.e.
No. obs. 2652 1938
Market-specific conduct parameters
20 SP 0.0167 (0.0194) 0.0021 (0.0152)
17 MG 0.0194 (0.0127) -0.0049 (0.0163)
19 RJ 0.0079 (0.0206) -0.0112 (0.0120)
16 BA 0.0004 (0.0100) -0.0268 * (0.0142)
(Parameters for 13 other markets not shown)
Factor prices
Fuel oil (interacted with fuel use) 18.1368 *** (2.7773) 20.1344 *** (2.7119)
Coal (interacted with fuel use) 0.0906 *** (0.0343) 0.0447 (0.0430)
Electricity 0.0343 *** (0.0125) 0.0494 *** (0.0169)
Labour -7.7850 *** (1.2287) -3.9898 *** (1.1363)
Freight (distance interacted with 0.0065 ** (0.0028) 0.0066 ** (0.0026)
                price of diesel oil)
Other supply-shifters
Size of sourcing plants -9.38E-08 (5.84E-07) 4.56E-08 (6.64E-07)
Age of sourcing plants 0.0191 (0.0316) 0.0188 (0.0321)
Price controls (Jan 91 to Oct 91) -4.4828 *** (0.8479)
Intercept (SP ) 12.1986 *** (2.6814) 6.9360 ** (2.8436)
(Other market-specific fixed effects included but not shown)
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors with bootstrapping to account for demand estimation
          in the first stage. 1000 repetitions, clustered by month (e.g. in (I) a bootstrap sample consists of
          156 month draws, and for every month in the bootstrap sample there are 17 markets).
          Demand estimates from the first stage of (II) also based on post-stabilisation subsample.
          ***  Significant at the 1% level; **  Significant at the 5% level; *  Significant at the 10% level
          Dependent variable is the price of cement in units of local currency per bag (at Dec 1999 prices)
(I)  IV (II)  IV
Full sample Post-stabilisation subsample
Figure 15: Estimation of a static pricing equation, assuming cost is not known. Instru-
mented with exogenous demand variables.
behavioural models nested in the static pricing equation p+ θf pη = cf (i.e. the theoretical counterpart
to the firm-level pricing equation (13), suppressing the error and writing it in the form marginal revenue
= marginal cost). It is clear that a η of -0.5 is not consistent with cartel behaviour (θ = 1). Profit
maximisation would lead the cartel to cut output until the cartel’s marginal revenue were equal (and
thus positive) to marginal cost. Nor will such a low value of η be consistent with a Cournot industry,
unless all firms have small market shares. To see this, notice that if the largest firm has a market share of
50%, then maxf{θf} = 0.5 and thus this firm’s marginal revenue, to be equated to its marginal cost, is
zero. Small market shares across local markets are clearly not the case in the Brazilian cement industry.
Any statistical model selection exercise à la Gasmi, Laﬀont and Vuong (1990, 1992) will thus result in,
say, both the cartel model and the Cournot model being rejected in favour of price-taking behaviour
by firms (θ = 0). Though misguided in the present case, the high correlation between factor prices
and cement prices ensure that the OLS regression of cement prices on factor prices (and other supply-
shifters, along with a set of market dummies) — i.e. under the hypothesis of price-taking behaviour —
displays good fit: R2 = 54%. Again, by misspecifying the set of alternative models generating outcomes
in the industry, a researcher would mistakenly conclude in favour of price-taking behaviour, not realising
that his estimates are simply picking up correlation between cement prices and factor prices.
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Figure 16: Estimated (average) price-cost margin on sales to RJ market, as estimated by
the static pricing equation, against Actual (constructed) price-cost margin. In constant
R$ per bag (December 1999 terms).
4.4 Inferring conduct in a constrained equilibrium
So far I have argued that what lies behind the very low market price elasticities of
demand in equilibrium is the threat of imports restraining prices. As laid out in the
theoretical framework of Section 2, the competitive supply of high-cost imports sets an
upper limit to prices. That market demand is inelastic in equilibrium owes to demand,
costs and firm conduct (i.e. the structural parameters of the data generating process)
being such that this upper limit to prices binds. The evidence in support of this claim
can be summarised as follows:
1. Demand is estimated to be inelastic in all 17 local markets. This is so irrespective
of the number and concentration of sellers, ranging from states where the one-firm
concentration (C1) is around 25% to states where C1 is as high as 80%.
2. In attempting to unravel the low equilibrium elasticities, one must consider price-
taking behaviour on the part of cement producers as an alternative explanation
to the binding presence of imports. By this alternative explanation — plausible a
priori — an industry facing such inelastic demand would not be able to cut output
to raise prices because competition among producers drives prices down toward
marginal cost. However, I reject competition on the basis of the large observed
price-cost margins. Producers enjoy considerable market power.
This dynamic story where the threat of entry restrains prices is further supported by
a wealth of anecdotal and interview-based evidence. It is also consistent, as argued in
Section 3.2, with the high correlation observed between cement prices and the exchange
rate, the latter having varied considerably over the time period.
I have also shown — and illustrated empirically — that in such a setting the identi-
fication of a standard pricing equation from the comparative statics of demand fails. I
now turn to the test of conduct spelled out in Proposition 3 to cast light on the pattern
of behaviour in the Brazilian cement industry. Admittedly, this test provides only a
suﬃcient statistic to reject Cournot conduct in favour of more collusive behaviour and
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the data requirements are large: one must observe both marginal cost and firm-level
quantity data. But the value of the test resides in uncovering firm-level behaviour when
market outcomes are constrained by the threat of entry. I show that the data rejects
Cournot as a benchmark for conduct in the cement industry, in favour of market divi-
sion. I finalise in Section 4.4.2 by illustrating the rationality of such a strategy in an
industry where firms meet in diﬀerent markets.
4.4.1 Rejecting Cournot behaviour in favour of collusion
Prior to stating the results of the test of Proposition 3 as it applies to the Brazilian
cement industry, I provide a flavour of why the data leads to the rejection of Cournot
behaviour by considering a specific example extracted from the data. This serves only
as an example of a broader trend in the data. As shown subsequently, there are many
instances in the data where firms undersupply local markets as compared to the supply
decisions of a Cournot firm59. In other words, there are many instances where the
marginal revenue of a firm in a given market were it adopting the Cournot conjecture —
taking its rivals’ output as given — significantly exceeds the marginal cost in supplying
that market.
A case in point Consider the two adjacent states of Alagoas (AL) and Sergipe (SE),
located in the northeast of Brazil (see Figure 6). These states are equally small both in
terms of market size and geography. Up until 1996 each also had only one plant located
within its borders: the firm Brennand operated the plant located inAL (respectively firm
1 and market A) and its rival Votorantim operated the plant located in SE (respectively
firm 2 and market B)60. Consider the year 1996. While firm 1 commands an 83% share
in market A, it does not supply to neighbouring market B, right next door to its plant
located in market A. Equally striking, firm 2 commands an 89% share in market B,
while attaining only a 7% share in the neighbouring market A, next door to its plant
in market B. Thus while in market A firm 2’s share pales in comparison to firm 1’s
share, in the neighbouring market B firm 2 dwarfs firm 1 (firm 1 in actual fact does not
supply to market B!) Average consumer prices in markets A and B are almost identical,
respectively R$ 9.47 (per bag) and R$ 9.46. As explained previously, I calculate firm
1’s marginal cost (including sales taxes and the reseller’s mark-up) in supplying markets
A and B to be respectively R$ 5.20 and R$ 5.47. As for firm 2, I calculate its cost in
supplying markets A and B to be respectively R$ 5.30 and R$ 5.17.61 This is illustrated in
the following picture and table, where I take the price elasticity of demand in equilibrium
for both markets to be −0.5:62
59As in the empirical literature on conduct, the Cournot assumption serves as a benchmark (e.g.
Parker and Röller 1997).
60In late 1996 a third firm, GJS, set up a plant close to Votorantim’s plant in SE. However, I abstract
away from this in this illustration, by considering the year 1996.
61Note that the state-capital cities of AL (market A) and SE (market B) are located less than 300
km apart. Nevertheless, the diﬀerence in Votorantim’s (say) cost of supplying AL and SE seems low:
only R$ 0.13. The reason is that Brazil has an awkward sales tax system which may work against
within-state shipments, as happens here, i.e. shipments from Votorantim’s plant in SE to resellers in
SE are penalised compared to its shipments across the state border to resellers in AL. This mitigates
the diﬀerence in average freight costs from Votorantim’s plant in SE : R$ 0.32 to resellers in SE and R$
0.77 to resellers in AL.
62The subsequent test takes the estimation of η in Section 4.2 into account. Also for simplicity, in
this illustration I compute an average ϕ for the year (for each firm-market combination).
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Firm 1 Firm 2
Market A Market B
Market A: AL
Firm 1: Brennand
Market B: SE
Firm 2: Votorantim
E.g.
(Year 1996) Price, p Share, qfq MR Cournot, p+
p
η
qf
q MC, c Can reject Cournot?
Local market l = A (AL)
Firm f = 1 (Bren) 9.47 0.83 9.47−9.47
0.5 0.83 = −6.25 5.20 No (ϕ1A < 0)
Firm f = 2 (Voto) 9.47 0.07 9.47−9.47
0.5 0.07 = 8.14 5.30 Yes (ϕ2A > 0)
Local market l = B (SE)
Firm f = 1 (Bren) 9.46 0 9.46−9.46
0.5 0 = 9.46 5.47 Yes (ϕ1B > 0)
Firm f = 2 (Voto) 9.46 0.89 9.46−9.46
0.5 0.89 = −7.38 5.17 No (ϕ2B < 0)
One is thus able to reject the hypothesis of firm 1 behaving in Cournot fashion to-
wards market B in 1996, since (perceived) marginal revenue p+ pη .
qf
q = 9.46 considerably
exceeds marginal cost 5.47, i.e. ϕ1B = 9.46 − 5.47 = 3.99, amounting to 42% of con-
sumer price. Likewise, I reject Cournot behaviour for firm 2 towards market B in 1996:
marginal revenue 8.14 considerably exceeds marginal cost 5.30, i.e. ϕ2A = 2.84, or 30%
of consumer price. Firm 1’s (firm 2’s) supply decision toward market B (market A)
corresponds to that of firm f in the right panel of Figure 5 in the theoretical framework
of Section 2.
Thus Cournot behaviour can in these instances be rejected in favour of more collusive
conduct. A story where Votorantim tacitly agrees to give Brennand the upper hand in
AL in exchange for the latter staying away from SE would help explain the observed
shipments. As noted previously, with a view to testing conduct, the marginal costs I
construct in this study are conservative, i.e. they err on the high side. (This understates
ϕ, working against the rejection of Cournot conduct.) In spite of this, the ϕ are not
only positive but sizeable: of the order of 30 - 40% of consumer price! Interestingly, note
that Brennand (firm 1) ships from its plant in AL (market A) to the states of PB, PE
and BA, located at further distances than SE (market B) and where prices are similar
to those in SE.
I now compute the test statistic of Proposition 3 for each active firm-market-month
combination, indexed as before by f , l and t respectively. A firm is active in a given
month if it owns a plant which is active in that month; that is, firm f is active iﬀP
l
P
i∈Oft qilt > 0 (recall that i indexes plant and Oft is the set of plants owned by
firm f in month t). For every month t in which a firm f is active, there are 17 (f, l, t )
combinations, one for each of the 17 markets, irrespective of the markets to which firm
f actually ships in month t. Now at each month t take firm f ’s marginal cost in serving
market l, cflt, as the minimum among the marginal costs in serving market l from the
plants that it owns, i.e. cflt := mini∈Oft cilt. From the Cournot pricing condition (10),
compute the test statistic
ϕˆflt = plt +
plt
ηˆlt
qflt
qlt
− cflt (15)
where ηˆlt is based on the demand estimates of Section 4.2. Recall that ϕˆflt > 0 is
suﬃcient to reject the null hypothesis that firm f is behaving in Cournot fashion towards
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market l in month t, in favour of more collusive behaviour; a Cournot firm perceiving
marginal revenue to exceed marginal cost would expand output beyond the observed
output (and, importantly, recall that this statistic allows for the constraining eﬀect of
imports). Notice that p, q and c are observed (or constructed: it is clear from (15) that
the construction of c as an upper bound to the true marginal cost conservatively tilts
the test statistic against rejection of Cournot), such that the randomness in ϕˆ stems
from the randomness of the estimated price elasticity ηˆlt.
Total number of active firm-market-month combinations, (f, l, t) 37536
Number of (f, l, t) combinations for which:
The upper limit to the 95% confidence interval for ηlt is negative 24696 100%
ϕˆflt is greater than zero 16806
ϕˆflt is significantly greater than zero at the 5% level 14849 60%
ϕˆflt is positive and exceeds 10% of consumer price 13197
ϕˆflt is positive and exceeds 20% of consumer price 8035 33%
ϕˆflt is positive and exceeds 30% of consumer price 3258
ϕˆflt is positive and exceeds 40% of consumer price 504
Total number of active firm-market-month combinations, (f, l, t) 37536
Number of (f, l, t) combinations for which: s.t. ϕˆflt > 0.2plt
ϕˆflt is positive when ηˆlt is taken as −0.3 25335 12757
ϕˆflt is positive when ηˆlt is taken as −0.5 27270 14237
ϕˆflt is positive when ηˆlt is taken as −0.7 28665 15575
The table above summarises the results. There are 37536 active firm-market-month
combinations (corresponding, therefore, to an average of 37536/17/156 ≈ 14 active
firms across the country in any given month). Since I calculate the 95% confidence
interval (C.I.) for ϕflt from the 95% C.I. for the price elasticity ηlt, I choose to drop
12840 observations for which the upper limit to the C.I. for ηlt is positive. In other
words, I conservatively consider only the 24696 combinations for which the C.I. for the
price elasticity lies in the interval (−∞, 0). I find that the null hypothesis of Cournot
behaviour allowing for the constraining eﬀect of imports, ϕflt ≤ 0, can be rejected at
the 5% level of significance in 14849 of these 24696 combinations. Put diﬀerently, under
the Cournot conjecture, one would expect firms to expand their supply to local markets
in 14849/24696 ' 60% of monthly supply decisions vis-à-vis observed outputs — these
firms are choosing output to the left of their Cournot reaction functions. As in the
earlier illustration, the test statistics ϕˆflt are not only positive but sizeable: the point
estimate for ϕˆflt exceeds 20% of consumer price in 8035 supply decisions! To check
robustness, the table also provides the number of supply decisions for which ϕˆflt > 0
when ϕˆ is calculated using elasticities of −0.3, −0.5 or −0.7. The rejection of Cournot
behaviour in favour of more collusive conduct is robust. It is clear from (15) and from
the table that a market price elasticity of demand greater (in absolute value) than the
estimated −0.5 on average reinforces this result. I further comment on the robustness
of this conclusion in Appendix B.
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4.4.2 Collusion and market division
The cement industry is commonly used to illustrate industry characteristics that the
literature on tacit collusion has deemed to enhance the likelihood of collusion63: see
Appendix B.3 for a summary. Unsurprisingly, the cement industry has a long history of
anticompetitive behaviour and antitrust litigation across several jurisdictions64. Tacit
collusion in the Brazilian cement industry, orchestrated for instance via market division,
is a concrete possibility in that the characteristics of the industry are consistent with the
characteristics which are understood to make tacit collusion more likely. For the sake of
illustration, I now turn to some simple collusive arrangements — relevant to the case at
hand — which may be supported in equilibrium.
Illustration 1: two firms with plants located in a single local market (A
local market which comes to mind here is Rio Grande do Sul (RS), where two firms,
Votorantim and Cimpor, operate plants, located very close to one another.)
Firm 2
Market
Firm 1
Consider two firms, 1 and 2, with symmetric marginal costs c facing a competitive
fringe of imports with marginal cost cI such that c < cI < pM , where pM is the monopoly
price as in the theoretical framework of Section 2. Recall that in such a setup the most
collusive price, which maximises aggregate (domestic) industry profit, is p = cI , where
the aggregate industry profit (per period) is Π := (cI − c)p−1(cI) and p−1(.) denotes the
demand function. As is standard in the literature on supergames, the most collusive price
may be supported in equilibrium by each firm adopting, say, the following symmetric
“grim” strategy in prices: set the collusive price p = cI in each period unless the rival
firm has set a diﬀerent price in a previous period, in which case set the competitive price
p = c. Assume for now that, given the symmetry, both firms split the market equally (i.e.
firm f ’s share sf = 12 , f = 1, 2). Collusion will then be sustainable if each firm’s payoﬀ
from sticking to the collusive agreement exceeds its payoﬀ from slightly undercutting its
rival and selling to the entire market in a single period; that is, collusion is sustainable
if
1
2
Π
1
1− δ ≥ Π
where δ is the per-period discount factor. This incentive constraint rearranges to δ ≥ 1
2
,
yielding the standard folk theorem whereby for a suﬃciently high discount factor the
collusive price p = cI (or any other price p such that c < p ≤ cI) may be supported in
equilibrium.
63As before, I refer to collusion in prices (or quantities), though I later comment on collusion in
capacity investments.
64See, for example, Dumez and Jeunemaître (2000). Ghemawat and Thomas (2004) cite the fines
imposed by the European Court of First Instance in 1994 on 42 cement-related undertakings across
Europe, in what has been one of the EU’s largest competition cases to date.
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Illustration 2: two firms and two neighbouring markets: firm 1 is located
in market A and firm 2 is located in market B next door (Two local markets
which come to mind here are the neighbouring states of Sergipe (SE) and Alagoas (AL),
equally small in terms of market size and geography. As stated previously, until 1996
Votorantim operated the only plant in SE and Brennand operated the only plant in next-
door AL. While in 1996 Votorantim commanded an 89% share in SE, it attained only
a 7% share in AL; on the other hand, Brennand commanded an 83% share in AL while
not supplying to SE.)
Firm 1 Firm 2
Market A Market B
Now assume that there are transport costs t > 0 associated with serving the neigh-
bouring market: while the marginal cost of serving a market in which one’s plant is
located is c (e.g. firm 1 in market A), the marginal cost of serving the market next-door
to one’s plant rises to c0 = c + t (e.g. firm 1 in market B), where c < c0 < cI (cI
as before). Demand is identical in each market, given as before by p−1(.). Denoting
Π := (cI − c)p−1(cI) as before, let Π0 := (cI − c0)p−1(cI). (This corresponds to firm 1’s
maximal profit in neighbouring market B were it to act as a monopolist in the supply
of that market65. Clearly Π > Π0.) It is easy to see that the collusive arrangement that
maximises aggregate industry profit in each market involves no wasteful cross-hauling
and corresponds to complete market division, where each market is supplied only by the
low-cost firm and prices in each market are p = cI : firm 1 supplies quantity p−1(cI) to
market A (i.e. shares s1A = 1, s2A = 1− s1A = 0) and firm 2 supplies quantity p−1(cI)
to market B (i.e. s2B = 1, s1B = 1− s2B = 0). But can this arrangement be supported
in equilibrium?
Begin by considering a situation where firms devise strategies that treat each market
separately, that is, cheating in a market does not trigger retaliation in other markets.
Then for the most collusive price p = cI (or any collusive price p above the competitive
price, equal to the high-cost firm’s cost c0, but lower than cI , i.e. c0 < p ≤ cI) to
be sustainable in a given market, the collusive arrangement must prescribe a strictly
positive share to both firms in that market. In this situation, both firms must enjoy
a non-trivial share of the collusive pie in each market, as can be seen by each firm’s
incentive constraint (IC) in, say, market A66:
s1AΠ
1
1− δ ≥ Π+ Π
war δ
1− δ low-cost firm 1’s IC in market A
(1− s1A)Π0
1
1− δ ≥ Π
0 high-cost firm 2’s IC in market A
65Realise that implicit in this statement is the regularity assumption that the monopoly price pM (c) :=
argmaxp(p− c)p−1(p) is an increasing function of marginal cost c. Thus pM (c0) > pM (c) > cI , where
pM(c) > cI is as before, such that firm 1 acting as a domestic monopolist in the supply of neighbouring
market B and facing the fringe of imports, would set p = cI .
66Note that firm 1 and firm 2’s shipments are then respectively q1A = s1Ap−1(cI) and q2A =
(1− s1A) p−1(cI).
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where Πwar := (c0 − c)p−1(c0) denotes industry profit under retaliation (price war, when
p = c0), earned by the low-cost firm. (Notice that the minimum share to be prescribed
to the high-cost firm is higher the lower is the discount factor: simply rewrite the high-
cost firm’s IC as 1 − s1A ≥ 1 − δ.) Hence if firms devise strategies that treat each
market separately, complete market division (s1A = s2B = 1) cannot be sustained in any
collusive equilibrium, regardless of the discount factor.
More naturally, firms will devise strategies that take into account the multimarket
nature of their contact, since in each market A or B the same two firms 1 and 2 can supply.
By modifying each firm’s strategy to ensure retaliation is triggered (i.e. setting price
equal to the competitive price c0) in both markets should any firm undercut the collusive
price in any market in a previous period, the collusive arrangement that maximises
aggregate industry profits across markets — i.e. setting p = cI with complete market
division — can now be supported in equilibrium for a high enough discount factor. To
see this, pool each firm’s incentive constraints across both markets; firm 1’s (say) IC is
now
s1AΠ
1
1− δ + (1− s2B)Π
0 1
1− δ ≥ Π+Π
0 + Πwar
δ
1− δ firm 1’s pooled IC (16)
Assuming that the collusive arrangement involves the low-cost firm in one market com-
manding the same share as the low-cost firm in the other market (i.e. s1A = s2B = s)
(16) can be rearranged to yield firm f ’s (f = 1, 2) incentive constraint:
δ ≥ (1− s)Π+ sΠ
0
Π+Π0 − Πwar (17)
The collusive arrangement can now involve complete market division, s = 1. Indeed,
for p = cI , setting s = 1 in (17) minimises the discount factor threshold above which
collusion is sustainable67:
δ ≥ Π
0
Π+Π0 − Πwar (18)
Thus for a high enough discount factor, the collusive scheme that maximises aggregate
industry profit in each market, setting p = cI in both markets and completely dividing
markets, can now be supported in equilibrium. Intuitively, as Bernheim and Whinston
(1990) have shown, through multimarket contact “slack enforcement power” may be
shifted from the market where a given firm is located, enjoying low cost, high share and
high profit, to the neighbouring market where that firm has high cost, low share and
low profit68.
67Recall that Π > Π0. Intuitively, when s = 1 the short-term gain from cheating (equal to (1− s)Π
in the own market plus sΠ0 in the neighbouring market) is lowest (and equal to Π0). Two comments
are in order. First, one can show that increasing the transportation cost t may increase the discount
factor threshold: though the deviant’s profits in the period of deviation fall since Π0 falls, profits in each
later period rise since Πwar rises, meaning that the long-term loss of collusive profits from retaliation
may become lower. Thus collusion would seem less likely as t rises, given that it makes the incentive-
constraint more stringent (for s = 1). However, as mentioned in the footnotes to the table on industry
characteristics in Appendix B.3, the profitability of collusion may be increasing in t, since the eﬀect of
eliminating wasteful cross-hauling, through market division, on profits may now be larger. Hence, a
greater payoﬀ from collusion through higher t, conditional on it being sustainable, would suggest that
firms would have greater incentive to design and implement a collusive scheme (see Ivaldi et al 2003,
footnote 48, on a similar idea). Second, when t = 0, then c0 = c, Π0 = Π and Πwar = 0, implying that
incentive constraints (17) and thus (18) collapse to the familiar δ ≥ 12 of Illustration 1.
68Notice that I have assumed Bertrand behaviour should collusion break down, but could just as well
have assumed Cournot competition. In this case, the right-hand side of incentive constraint (16) would
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Illustration 3: three firms and two neighbouring markets: firms 1 and 2
have plants located in market A and market B next door, while firm 3 has a
plant located in market B only (Two local markets which come to mind here are
the neighbouring states of Rio de Janeiro (RJ) and Minas Gerais (MG). Considering
these two markets, four firms have plants located in both RJ and MG, while two firms
have plants located in MG only. The extent to which these two latter firms cross-haul
cement from their plants in MG to the RJ market is limited: in 1999 Camargo Correa
commanded a 20% share in its home market MG but did not supply to the neighbouring
RJ, while Soeicom had a 9% share in its home market MG and a (somewhat) lower 6%
share in neighbouring RJ.)
Firm 2 Firm 2
Market A Market B
Firm 3
Firm 1 Firm 1
As before, assume that the cost of supplying a market from a plant located in that
market is c but rises to c0 = c+t when supplying from a plant located in the neighbouring
market. Demand p−1(.) is again identical in each market, recall pM(c0) > pM(c) > cI
and denote Π0 and Π as before. Now consider the following collusive agreement: (i) in
market A each of firms 1 and 2 supplies a share sA of the market, with firm 3 accounting
for the remaining (1− 2sA) share, such that price is p = cI ; and (ii) in market B firm
3 supplies a share sB of the market, with firms 1 and 2 accounting for the remaining
(1− sB) /2 each, again such that price is p = cI .69 The (pooled) incentive constraint for
each of firms 1 and 2, that operate plants in both markets, becomes:µ
sAΠ+
1− sB
2
Π
¶
1
1− δ ≥ Π+Π
since a deviation triggers the competitive price p = c in both markets, which can be
rearranged to
δ ≥ 3− 2sA + sB
4
(19)
The incentive constraint for firm 3, with a plant in market B only, is
((1− 2sA)Π0 + sBΠ)
1
1− δ ≥ Π
0 +Π
which is equivalent to
δ ≥ (1− sB)Π+ 2sAΠ
0
Π+Π0
(20)
have to be modified as follows: (i) a deviant firm would now earn less than Π + Π0 in the period of
deviation (the other firm would still supply its collusive quantities in the period of deviation, and the
deviant firm would set its output in each market based on its reaction function, as illustrated in Figure
5, thus expanding output in the neighbouring market where it has a low share), and (ii) upon retaliation
either firm would also earn positive payoﬀs in its neighbouring market, where it incurs a higher cost
(and, as Figure 5 makes clear, the Cournot equilibrium outcome would not necessarily be unique).
69In market A, firms 1 and 2 will then supply q1A = q2A = sAp−1(cI) and firm 3 will supply
q3A = (1− 2sA) p−1(cI). In market B, firm 3 will supply q3B = sBp−1(cI) and firms 1 and 2 will each
supply q1B = q2B = 12 (1− sB) p−1(cI).
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As in illustration 2, the collusive arrangement that maximises aggregate industry
profit across markets involves no wasteful cross-hauling, where each market is supplied
only by the low-cost firms (i.e. 2sA = 1 such that firm 3 does not supply to market
A) and prices in each market are p = cI . Plugging sA = 1/2 and, say, sB = 2/3 such
that all three firms produce the same quantity, sustainability constraints (19) and (20)
become δ ≥ 2
3
and δ ≥ Π/3+Π
0
Π+Π0 respectively.
Capacity and collusion Some remarks about the role of capacity in the Brazilian
cement industry. As noted in Section 3.3, capacity significantly exceeds production, and
this (low) capacity utilisation appears to be fairly symmetric across plants and firms,
despite the asymmetric capacities across these plants and firms. Thus, for instance, plant
1 with a capacity of 2 mtpa may be running at a 65% capacity utilisation while plant
2, owned by a rival firm, with a capacity of 1 mtpa may be operating at the same 65%
capacity utilisation. This observation is consistent with a situation where all domestic
producers adhere to the collusive arrangement, with no producer “free riding”. (This is
reinforced by the fact that all producers are long-time members of the cement producers’
trade association (SNIC), an active lobbying outfit for the industry.) The corollary to
this observation is that there appears to be no relevant fringe to the (tacit) cartel70.
Further, evenly-distributed idle capacity across firms would serve the important purpose
of disciplining the cartel: the threat of punishment would not be credible were capacity
to be tight71 72.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I show that when an industry faces potential entry and this threat of
entry constrains pre-entry prices, cost and conduct will not be identified from the com-
parative statics of equilibrium. The well-established technique of relying on the jumping
around (i.e. shifting and rotating) of the demand curve to empirically distinguish be-
tween the hypothesis of a high-cost competitive industry and the alternative of a low-cost
oligopoly with market power fails in the event that the low-cost oligopoly is constrained
by potential entry. Because the extent to which the no-entry constraint binds may be
70More recently, an entrant, Mizú, has successfully managed to establish a foothold in local markets
in and around the state of Espírito Santo (ES ), where it is based. Set up in 1998 by a large independent
ready-mixed concrete firm, Mizú signed a long-term contract with a steel producer (Companhia Siderúr-
gica de Tubarão) to supply it with steel slag, which it grinds and mixes with ground clinker, imported
from as far as Japan, producing slag cement. Mizú’s (grinding-only) plant is located conveniently next
door to the steelworks and to the port of Vitória. In contrast to established cement producers, by 2003
Mizú was selling up to capacity (0.7 mtpa). It would appear that the established producers have accom-
modated Mizú’s entry, given its limited capacity and the irreversibility of its investment. (As noted in
Appendix A, consumption and shipment figures compiled by the cement producers’ trade association,
and used in this paper, do not consider Mizú. The distortion nevertheless is small in view of Mizú’s (to
date) limited capacity, limited geographic scope and recent entry.)
71A further strategic role may be that of helping deter entry, as studied in the literature (e.g. Dixit
1980).
72A final comment regarding the possibility that producers collude in capacity investments, in addition
to colluding in product market outcomes. Rather than restricting capacity and hence output, producers
overinvest in capacity, as just discussed. Other characteristics of the cement industry, such as the
lumpiness, infrequency, long life and irreversibility of investment, would further suggest that the scope
for collusion in capacities is limited. See Ivaldi et al (2003) for a discussion.
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unobserved to the researcher, since in equilibrium entry is not observed, some studies of
market power claiming to consistently estimate structural parameters of the data gen-
erating process may actually be underestimating the degree of market power. A typical
situation of such limit pricing is that where a domestic oligopoly faces a competitive
fringe of foreign suppliers.
This result recommends caution to enthusiasts of the estimation of market power
when cost data is lacking, and has important implications for antitrust practitioners,
particularly in a world where trade barriers are being pulled down. My paper provides an
additional theoretical setting to a criticism advanced by Corts (1999) regarding the non-
robust performance of static structural estimation in the absence of cost when applied
to a dynamic model. In an imports-constrained setting, I show one way in which a
researcher, equipped with cost and firm-level data, may delve deeper into the pattern of
conduct in an industry where firms meet in diﬀerent markets.
The Brazilian cement industry provides a clear-cut illustration. An elastically-
supplied fringe of high-cost imports restrains domestic prices and the market price
elasticities of demand are of the order of -0.5 in equilibrium. Despite this binding
constraint, the behavioural model generating outcomes in the industry is identified from
the observed data. While the estimation of a static pricing equation incorrectly points
to competition, I show that conduct is more collusive than the Cournot benchmark,
characterised by (tacit) market division. I provide examples of simple dynamic multi-
market games which give rise to such equilibrium behaviour. The price limit set by the
delivered cost of imports would seem to provide a natural focal price; market division
would further enhance collusive pay-oﬀs by limiting cross-hauling.
A clear policy recommendation emanating from the illustration is the finding that
producers possess substantial market power and that imports (in the form of cement or
the intermediate product clinker) have an important role to play in curbing the ability
of domestic producers to further raise prices above marginal cost. To the extent that
investments may be made to reduce transaction (entry) costs of imports, one should
not necessarily expect to observe an increased share of imports but certainly expect
higher consumer welfare in the form of lower prices. Such a recommendation stands
in direct contrast to recent policy experience, whereby the cement industry successfully
managed to lobby the government into enacting “antidumping” measures against foreign
producers who were attempting to make inroads into Brazil’s local markets.
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A Appendix: Data
This appendix comments on the sources of data and how I treat the data. I also perform
robustness checks on my direct computations of marginal cost.
Anonymous acknowledgement I wish to express my gratitude to all the people re-
lated to the cement industry whom I have interviewed during the course of this project.
This project would not have been possible without their help, particularly in regard to
the data collection and validation eﬀort. I do not name them in order to preserve their
confidentiality but hereby acknowledge them by citing their professional relationship
with the cement supply chain: representatives for various state-level construction sec-
tor trade associations (SINDUSCONs); representatives for the cement industry’s trade
association (SNIC); representatives for the technical arm of the cement industry’s trade
association (ABCP); sales representatives, engineers and executives of cement produc-
ers; representatives of cement buyers (resellers, ready-mixed concrete firms, construction
firms and producers of construction aggregates); representatives for equipment suppliers
to the cement industry; representatives for factor suppliers to the cement industry; Con-
federation of National Industry (CNI); Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics
(IGBE); oﬃcials of regulatory agencies; oﬃcials of government ministries; investment
bank analysts; international traders in cement; academics.
A.1 Sources and treatment of data
Cement consumption by state (i.e. demand by local market) Monthly series
by state, in 1000 tonnes of cement, are obtained from the annual reports (and other
reports) of the Brazilian cement industry’s trade association, the National Syndicate of
the Cement Industry (SNIC). This body has played a leading role in the history of the
Brazilian cement industry and represents almost the entirety of the set of producers73.
To compile consumption figures for a given state, SNIC aggregates reported shipments
by its members to that state. Thus I observe shipments by cement producers to buyers
broken out by destination state. Four possible sources of distortion, each deemed to
be small, are: (i) Consumption figures do not include shipments by non-members to
the association (namely Mizú and Davi: see footnote 73). The distortion is small given
the limited capacity, limited geographic scope and recent entry dates attached to these
non-members; (ii) Consumption figures do not include imports. Again the distortion is
small in view of the limited penetration of imports (see Section 3.3); (iii) Consumption
figures do not account for any cross-state shipping at the reseller level (i.e. shipments
by resellers in state l shipping across to buyers further downstream located in state
n 6= l). In compiling consumption by state, a shipment by a cement producer to a
buyer located in a given state counts towards consumption in that state. This distortion
is considered small in that the high cost of transporting cement and the fact that the
industry takes into account the possibility of trade arbitrage when setting commercial
73Up until 2003 only two recent entrants were not members of the trade association: (i) Cimento
Mizú, set up in 1998 by a large independent ready-mixed concrete firm, Polimix, and (ii) Cimento Davi,
set up in 2001. Both concerns consist of relatively small-scale grinding operations (respectively 0.7
mtpa and 0.4 mtpa to date), importing clinker from as far as Asia and producing slag cement (both
are located in close proximity to steel producers, from whom they purchase blast furnace slag, based
respectively in the states of Espírito Santo, ES, and Minas Gerais, MG.) See footnote 70.
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terms make the scope for cross-state shipping by resellers limited. Further, the bulkiness,
fast turn and short shelf life of cement leads producers to reach far “down the trade”, via
direct-from-plant deliveries and own distribution terminals: in spatial terms, reselling
is largely a local business. In any case, shipments by resellers into a state ought to
approximately cancel shipments by resellers out of that state; and (iv) Variation in
inventories downstream are not accounted for. Again the distortion is small given that
the characteristics of cement (e.g. short shelf life) means inventory levels and their
time-series variation is limited.
Flow of cement from plants to states Annual shipments of cement from each plant
to each state is obtained from SNIC, from the same database from which the monthly
consumption series by state are extracted. Thus I observe, for each year T , an I × L
shipment matrix with element qilT denoting the shipments from plant i to state (local
market) l in year T . To obtain the flow of cement from plants to states on a monthly
basis, I assume that the distribution of shipments to market l across sourcing plants is
invariant over the 12 months in each year. Thus I take plant i’s shipments to market l in
month t ∈ T to be qilt = qilT?
i qilT
qlt where qlt denotes the consumption in market (state)
l in month t, as detailed above.
Cement prices by state Current retail cement prices in units of local currency for
the standard 50 kg bag are provided by the Brazilian oﬃce of national statistics, the
Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IGBE). This oﬃce is one of Brazil’s two
main providers of economic statistics, charged with carrying out population censuses,
compiling the national accounts and publishing price indices. In eﬀect, the cement price
series I use is collected to compute the latter. Monthly series by state are available
on the median price for a sample of retail stores (commonly referred to as resellers)
located in each state. (Producer prices are not observed; these are backed out from
retail prices as explained below.) Owing to the high levels of inflation prevailing in the
first one-quarter of the time period I consider74, particular attention has been paid to
the conversion of current cement prices to constant prices (in December 1999 terms).
While this is done using a General Price Index (GPI), I also convert cement prices
using other (economy-wide) price indices, such as a Consumer Price Index (CPI) or a
Wholesale Price Index (WPI), to check the robustness of the estimation results (these
are, respectively, the “IGP-DI”, the “IPC-br” and the “IPA-DI”, all published by the
Fundação Getúlio Vargas). Further, where possible, I compare the constant price series
I calculate for each state with reports on cement prices to be found in trade publications
or the press. For example, the constant cement price series I calculate indicate a sharp
increase in real terms in 1992; this is confirmed by aggregate real cement price indices
and accounts published in trade reports at the time. One must also point out that
despite the high level of inflation in the first half of the 1990s, the economic environment
was far from chaotic; economic agents had learned how to cope with a chronic and fast-
changing price level, and to anticipate it reasonably well in the short term. It is thus
possible for the researcher to filter (upward and downward) variation in real prices from
the much larger (upward) variation in nominal prices in the pre-stabilisation phase of
the time period I cover.
74That is, the pre-stabilisation phase, or the 42 monthly observations between January 1991 and June
1994, out of a total of 156 observations (up to December 2003).
56
Exogenous demand variables Several alternative series of economic activity, either
in the construction and building sector or aggregated across sectors of the economy,
are available as proxies for the exogenous demand for cement. The favoured series,
issued by the Brazilian oﬃce of statistics (IBGE), reports the real index of activity in
the construction sector for each of the 27 states, on an annual basis. Importantly, this
series follows from a volume decomposition of Value Added in the construction sector
(from the National Accounts) and should thus be a good proxy for exogenous demand.
I blow up the index series for each state using the relative size of the construction sector
between states, also obtained from the National Accounts; these can then be compared
cross-sectionally (i.e. across states). Alternative quarterly series are available, which I
use in checking the robustness of my estimation results.
Taking states to represent local markets In terms of geography, the most disag-
gregated level at which demand-side data are observed is the state level. Data availability
thus require that I take each state to represent a market (i.e. I do not observe data at
the “SMSA” or city level)75. However, I believe that this is sound, as follows. As the
econometrician, I observe the flow of cement from each plant directly to buyers (i.e.
to resellers and to consumers) in any given state. As explained above, the scope for
cross-state shipping by resellers is limited. Thus price and consumption observations
— obtained from diﬀerent sources, as explained above — can reasonably be paired. A
potential distortion arises from the possibility that the larger states may contain more
than one local market with heterogeneous demand conditions, and that therefore iden-
tifying states with markets may hide important variation at a more local level where
agents interact. To my defence, however, I discard the largest northern states, albeit for
another reason as I explain in Section 4.2. Further, in the data I observe that cement can
travel over significantly large distances from plants located in a state to buyers located
in another state. Several field interviews and price data obtained directly from a sample
of producers suggest that the spatial variation of prices within a state is minimal: prices
are mostly uniform within a state. Of note, several studies in the literature have taken
US states (of sizes similar to and as diverse as their Brazilian counterparts) to represent
markets, such as Sutton (1998), FTC (1966) and Newmark (1998).
Factor prices Factor prices are either observed in the form of current prices, in which
case they are converted to constant prices as explained above, or already reported in
the form of constant prices. Though alternative series proxying each factor price are
available — which I use as alternative instruments in the demand estimation or to check
the robustness of the supply-side estimation — the main series are:
• Fuel oil: country-wide delivered prices from refineries in units of local currency per
kg (excluding sales taxes) are obtained, on a monthly basis, from the oil industry
regulator, the National Agency for Oil. I add sales taxes to these prices according
to legislation. (Owing to policy in the oil sector, price variation across regions
during the time period of the study, has been minimal.)
75Notice that this is done only for the purpose of estimating demand. The availability of plant-to-state
shipment data allows me to circumvent the tricky task of defining (geographic) markets in my treatment
of supply: for any given plant, the geographic area which is relevant to its supply decision (i.e. that
plant’s “market”) is endogenous — depending on demand, cost and conduct — and these plant-specific
areas overlap across plants.
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• Diesel oil: country-wide delivered prices from refineries in units of local currency
per litre are obtained, on a monthly basis, from the oil industry regulator, the
National Agency for Oil.
• Coal: FOB prices of coal in local currency units per tonne are obtained, on an
annual basis, averaged across mining firms, from the Ministry for Mining and
Energy. Price lists are also obtained from a sample of mining firms. Of note, coal
mines are located in the South of the country; freight to cement plants employing
coal as kiln fuel (largely located in the South) is added accordingly (see comments
on freight cost below).
• Electricity: state-level delivered prices to (high-voltage) industrial consumers in
local currency units per MWh are obtained, on a monthly basis, from the electricity
industry regulator, the National Agency for Electrical Energy.
• Labour: manufacturing-industry real wage indices in the 12 states with the largest
industrial output, in addition to a country-wide index, are obtained, on a monthly
basis, from the Confederation of National Industry.
Plant characteristics Plant characteristics such as ownership, capacity (i.e. kiln
pyroprocessing capacity and grinding capacity), number of kilns, age, technology (i.e.
the type of equipment and process, whether dry or wet, whether a preheater is employed)
and the fuel mix employed by kilns (largely either fuel oil, coal, or more recently pet
coke or natural gas) is available from the Brazilian trade association76 and from diﬀerent
editions of the World Cement Directory, published by the European Cement Association
(Cembureau) every three years, compiling information on cement producers across the
world. Data is complemented by or confirmed against information from (i) industry
publications, (ii) investment banking reports, (iii) the press, (iv) companies’ websites,
(v) academic publications, and/or (vi) field interviews (see below). Of note, capacity
and technology data may contain significant measurement error. The shortest distance
by road from each plant to the main metropolitan areas in each state is available from
the Ministry of Transport.
Computing plant marginal cost: an upper bound Using the fixed-coeﬃcient
nature of cement production technology, I can directly calculate marginal cost from
observed factor prices, the observed plant characteristics and engineering estimates of the
fixed coeﬃcients. I employ the term “calculate” rather than “estimate” since obtaining
marginal cost does not involve statistical inference; however, calculated marginal costs
are indeed estimates — in fact they are estimated upper bounds to the true marginal
costs — in the sense that there inevitably are unobserved plant characteristics, as I
explain below. In view of the fixed-coeﬃcient technology and my understanding of the
industry, I model plant marginal cost as flat in quantity up to capacity. To the extent
76Plenty of other information is available, such as stock levels by plant, or the form shipments from
each plant take, in terms of packaging (in bags or in bulk) or in terms of the means of transportation
(by road, rail or water). Aggregating across all plants, between 1997 and 1999 81% of shipments were in
bags, and 91% of shipments were by road. The breakdown of shipments among diﬀerent buyer channels
is also available, with resellers accounting for 76% and ready-mixed concrete firms accounting for 11%,
in this same period.
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that marginal cost varies across kilns within the same plant complex, this will be an
approximation to the true plant marginal cost which would then be a step function in
quantity. (For example, if a plant consists of two kilns, labelled 1 and 2 in order of most
eﬃcient first, with kiln marginal costs denoted c1 and c2 > c1, denoting other marginal
cost by c, and denoting kiln capacities by K1 and K2, then marginal cost would be
MC(q) = c + c1 if q ≤ K1 or c + c2 if K1 ≤ q ≤ K2.) Clearly, this will be of relevance
only if plant capacity utilisation varies suﬃciently over time that the marginal kiln in
operation diﬀers (e.g. a less eﬃcient kiln is fired up and shut down for months at a time
according to demand). I thus mitigate any distortion stemming from my approximation
of plant marginal cost as being flat in quantity by taking capacity utilisation (see below)
and the characteristics of the marginal kiln into account when computing marginal cost.
(It should also be noted that in recent decades the trend for cement plants has been to
favour large single-kiln production lines as against multiple small lines, in view of the
economies of scale.) It is also worth clarifying the way a kiln works. A kiln, when in
operation, must run at close to full capacity; it cannot be operated at any given moment
at, say, 50% capacity. Further, firing up a kiln is costly so when in operation a kiln
typically runs for at least several days or weeks. As for plant marginal costs, it is clear
that these will vary across plants according to the technology, capacity and age of the
equipment and the fuel employed by the kiln; these are accounted for to the best of my
knowledge as I explain below77. Plant marginal costs fall into four main categories —
kiln fuel, electricity, mineral extraction royalties, and labour/packaging/other costs — as
follows:
1. Kiln fuel: This is the main component of plant marginal cost. Based on engineering
estimates, the heat content required to produce 1 kg of clinker using the dry process
(see Section 3.1) will typically fall in the 650 - 850 kcal range (e.g. see World
Cement, January 2000 issue). (The wet process consumes over double this.) A
kiln’s (thermal) energy eﬃciency will depend on the capacity, technology (including
the specifications of preheating, cooling and waste heat recovery systems used) and
age of the kiln. (The kiln’s brick lining has to be changed periodically, and the
time since the last relining will also impact the energy eﬃciency of the kiln.)
Interview-based evidence, however, indicates that the energy eﬃciency of kilns in
operation in the Brazilian cement industry is (i) high relative to its global peers
(including the US industry), with producers having shifted to the dry process
chiefly over the 1980s, (ii) has continued to improve over the 1990s, and (iii)
presents low variation across producers (with perhaps two exceptions, both with
lower productivity). Based on observed plant characteristics and interviews, I
classify the energy eﬃciency of each plant as “above average”, “average” and
“below average”, assuming energy contents of 690, 730 and 800 kcal/kg of clinker
respectively. (For example, with respect to kiln capacity, a kiln with capacity in
excess of 1 mtpa will require a heat content approximately 6% below that of a kiln
with capacity of 0.25 mtpa, controlling for other characteristics.)78 To arrive at the
77To this end I have met with engineers working in cement plants or working for the technical arm
of the cement producers’ trade association (the Brazilian Association for Portland Cement, ABCP), as
well as meeting executives of equipment suppliers to the cement industry.
78In addition to the above, I use other sources of information such as a report compiled by the
industry’s trade association in 1993 on plant productivity with respect to energy inputs (stating the
amount of hydrocarbon equivalent burned by tonne of clinker produced by plant). Note further that
I neglect time-series variation in plant-specific energy eﬃciency given that this has been low over the
time period of the study.
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marginal cost relating to kiln fuel, I consider two types of fuel — fuel oil and coal
— for which I observe prices, as explained above. I then use the observed fuel mix
for each plant and the properties of each fuel to obtain fuel cost. (For example, an
average-eﬃciency kiln burning a certain grade of fuel oil — with “inferior calorific
power” of 9750 kcal/kg of fuel oil — will require 730/9750 × 1000 = 75 kg of fuel
oil per tonne of clinker.)
2. Electricity: While thermal energy is required to produce clinker in the kiln, elec-
tricity is used mostly for grinding raw material, solid kiln fuel (such as coal) and
clinker — a process known as comminution — and to a lesser extent to operate
conveyor belts and packaging lines. Considerations here are similar to those made
for kiln fuel. For example, in terms of technology, the more modern vertical roller
mills tend to consume less power than the ball mill system. Again based on engi-
neering estimates, the total plant electricity content required to produce 1 tonne
of cement typically falls in the region of 90 - 105 kWh.
3. Mineral extraction royalties: The marginal cost component arising from the ex-
traction of raw material (limestone and clay), from a quarry usually located within
the plant complex, follows from legislation. The “Financial Compensation for the
Extraction of Mineral Resources” (CFEM) requires that the cement producer col-
lect 2% of its revenues from the sale of cement, net of sales taxes and freight, in
the way of compensation to the government (see below for producer prices and
sales taxes). Exceptions to this requirement, where negotiated between producers
and the government, are not observed (see comment below on unobservables).
4. Labour/packaging/other costs: As mentioned in Section 3.1, labour essentially
performs a supervisory role. One may argue that a certain proportion of a plant’s
labour cost is fixed. The variable proportion of labour would correspond to quar-
rying personnel and possibly workers involved with the packaging and distribution
centre operations. I refrain from discussion, given the relatively low cost of these
plant operations and the fact any bias in the direction of overstating marginal
cost reinforces the results of this study. Packaging costs will vary according to
the proportion of a plant’s production that is shipped in bags (largely in the form
of the standard 50 kg bag) as opposed to bulk shipments; recall that I observe
this proportion. As such, based on information at hand, I take this component of
marginal cost to amount to around 5% of net producer price.
A final comment relates to unobservables. Despite a researcher calculating marginal
cost to the best of his ability from observables, there will always be an unobserved (to
the researcher) component to productivity across plants. In view of this, in computing
marginal cost I choose to “err on the side of conservatism”, in this case by overstating
marginal cost. I claim the calculated marginal cost is thus an upper bound to the true
marginal cost, thus leading to an understated price-cost margin. The reason behind this
choice is that, when I turn to the testing of conduct in Section 4.4, such a bias reinforces
the results of this study. There are several potential sources of bias (in the direction of
overstating marginal cost). One source of unobserved plant heterogeneity may be the
quantity discount enjoyed by Votorantim, the largest producer on a nationwide basis,
in acquiring fuel oil, electricity or trucking services vis-à-vis the smaller producers. To
the extent that producers manage to acquire factors on diﬀerent terms (controlling for
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location), the marginal cost I compute may be overstated for the firms with greater
bargaining power over suppliers. Another possibility is that producers substitute away
from traditional kiln fuels such as fuel oil and coal in favour of cheaper alternatives79. Yet
another bias stems from the formulation I use to compute the marginal cost of cement
(see footnote 27). For simplicity I take 1 kg of cement to correspond to 1 kg of clinker.
Now clinker is the most expensive input to the grinding process and even “pure” cement
(referred to commonly as type I cement, or simply ordinary cement) is comprised of 96%
clinker and 4% gypsum by weight. To the extent that diﬀerent formulations of cement
are produced, with a lower proportion of clinker (and a higher content of lower-cost
additives, such as slag, pozzolane and/or filler), the bias in the direction of overstating
marginal cost will be higher. For example, composite (type II) cement, with a clinker
content in the region of 70 - 80%, accounted for 78% of the Brazilian industry’s total
production between 1999 and 2001. Finally, note that fixed cost heterogeneities across
plants, stemming for example from decreasing unit capital costs as a function of capacity
(i.e. economies of scale), are not relevant for the computation of marginal cost and the
resulting price-cost margins.
Computing plant-to-market freight cost This is the first component to ex-plant
marginal cost that I consider (the other two are the reseller mark-up and producers’
sales taxes). In the cement industry, as seen in Section 3.1, freight is a large component
of cost. The vast majority of shipments from producers to buyers take place by road and
are provided for by the producers. I do not observe the exact freight rates paid by cement
producers. But fortunately I do observe a good proxy for the freight of cement. The
transportation of agricultural goods such as soyabean and maize is reportedly a close
substitute to the supply of cement freight, in view of product and market characteristics
(Soares and Caixeta Filho 1996)80. I use a database containing approximately 30,000
observations on freight prices for some agricultural goods collected over the period 1997
to 2003 for thousands of diﬀerent routes across Brazil81. Figure 17 summarises the
results of some auxiliary reduced-form regressions. These should be seen as hedonic
regressions with the purpose of predicting the price of freight. Given that I do not
observe quantities demanded and supplied in the market for freight, I cannot estimate
a structural model of the market for freight. (Nor do I think this is necessary in view
of my objective, which is to predict the freight cost of cement from plant i to local
79Indeed, since 2000 the use of pet coke (imported by some producers themselves from the Mexican
Gulf) and natural gas (to the extent that a plant is located in proximity to a pipeline) is on the rise.
A clinker kiln will in principle burn any material with a suﬃciently high energy content, such as used
rubber tyres, solvents and hazardous waste materials. The equipment supplier FLSmidth speculates
that in the long term the cost of kiln fuel could fall to zero, or even turn negative, with cement producers
being paid to dispose of waste materials.
80For example, an interview with a cement industry executive revealed that during the soyabean har-
vesting season (March through May) the producer he works for encourages large resellers to themselves
pick orders up at the plant, for fear of relying too heavily on the scarce supply of outside truckers
observed during these months. This further suggests that freight of cement and freight of soyabean are
close substitutes, and therefore that their prices should be similar. Most cement producers outsource
trucking services, mostly to independent truckers who are registered in their databases and simply turn
up at the door and are hired on the spot (or are hired through cooperatives or middlemen). According
to this executive, the cement industry is the top industrial contractor of trucking services in the country.
81I am indebted to Professor José Vicente Caixeta Filho of ESALQ, at the University of São Paulo,
for providing an extract of the SIFRECA freight database. Data pertaining to soyabean, maize and
(the mineral) limestone was kindly made available.
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market l based on observed data.) Freight prices (once converted to constant prices as
explained earlier82) are regressed on exogenous variables such as the distance of the route,
the squared distance, a shipment-to-port dummy (to capture exports), transportation-
mode dummies (by water or by rail, as opposed to by road), seasonal dummies or
monthly dummies (to capture the harvesting cycle), the price of diesel oil (the main cost
component for freight), a packaging dummy (shipment of bagged produce as opposed to
bulk) and product-type dummies (e.g. powdered soyabean), in addition to interaction
variables. It is clear from the R2 of the OLS regressions that the fit is very high;
the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are low. Freight prices (in R$ per tonne)
are increasing in distance (and concave, though slightly so over the relevant range).
Consider the results for specification (II). At the sample means of the variables (735
km for distance and R$ 0.422 per litre for the price of diesel oil), the predicted price of
freight for a tonne of soyabean shipped in bulk by road to a destination other than a
port and in the month of April amounts to 3.358 + 0.0405× 735− 5.44× 10−7 × 7352 +
6.519 × 0.422 =3.358 + 29.768 − 0.294 + 2.751=R$ 35.56 (with a standard error of R$
0.21). Shipping to a port (possibly as a result of longer waiting times to unload) adds
1.813 + 0.00041 × 735=R$ 2.12 (s.e. R$ 0.15), and when this shipping to a port takes
place during the harvest season freight prices are predicted to increase by a further R$
2.30 (s.e. R$ 0.32). Shipping by waterway costs 14.269 + 0.00498× 735=R$ 17.93 (s.e.
R$ 0.25) less than by road, while shipping by railway costs 2.349 + 0.01538 × 735=R$
13.66 (s.e. R$ 0.28) less than by road. Shipping in bags as opposed to in bulk raises the
price of freight by R$ 0.25 though this estimate is not significantly diﬀerent from zero.
Compared to April, the peak month of the harvesting season, shipments in any other
month of the year are cheaper (all coeﬃcients on monthly dummies and their interactions
with distance are negative). Shipments in January, the month in which prices are lowest,
are R$ 4.87 (s.e. R$ 0.25) lower compared to April. Note that the variation in diesel
oil prices over the period is R$ 0.38, accounting thus for a R$ 2.49 (s.e. 0.17) variation
in freight prices (this is admittedly low, owing possibly to correlation between diesel
oil prices and other variables). I choose to predict the plant-to-market freight cost for
cement based on specification (II), on account of observables such as distance from the
plant to the market, means of transport and the price of diesel oil.
Backing out net producer prices from retail prices The other components to
ex-plant marginal cost, apart from plant-to-consumer freight, are the reseller (retailer)
mark-up and producers’ sales taxes. Recall that the lion’s share of the Brazilian cement
business consists of producers shipping bagged cement to resellers, who then sell directly
to the end user (a small-scale consumer); I only observe the prices set by these resellers,
not the prices set by producers. However, I back out producer prices as follows. Based
on several field interviews83, I model the reseller as competitive. I thus avoid the issue
of double marginalisation. A reseller’s cost consists largely of (i) two forms of sales
tax (“PIS” and “COFINS”, not to be confused with the sales taxes collected by the
producer), which are proportional to the retail price (varying from 2.65 to 3.65% over
82Freight prices, in units of local currency per tonne of produce shipped, are thus in December 1999
terms.
83These interviews include cement producers’ field representatives and sales executives, buyers of
cement and representatives of the construction sector’s trade associations across a sample of local
markets. Information provided in these interviews was also consistent with a report on the supply chain
prepared by a consulting firm for the cement industry trade association (Booz Allen & Hamilton 1990).
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coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
No. obs. 27974 27974 30367
R2 0.894 0.899 0.904
Intercept 1.423 *** (0.244) 3.358 *** (0.361) 5.413 *** (0.447)
Distance of route 0.0387 *** (0.0005) 0.0405 *** (0.0007) 0.0433 *** (0.0008)
Distance of route squared -8.12E-07 *** (2.49E-07) -5.44E-07 ** (2.56E-07) -9.62E-07 *** (2.38E-07)
Port destination dummy 2.135 *** (0.166) 1.813 *** (0.267) 1.720 *** (0.238)
Water transport dummy -17.405 *** (0.212) -14.269 *** (1.094) -11.516 *** (1.246)
Rail transport dummy -12.410 *** (0.343) -2.349 *** (0.571) -3.149 *** (0.540)
Harvest season dummy 2.341 *** (0.118)
Port during harvest dummy 2.802 *** (0.311) 2.295 *** (0.318) 2.248 *** (0.277)
Price of diesel oil 6.815 *** (0.441) 6.519 *** (0.443)
Shipment in bags dummy 0.249 (0.204) 0.489 ** (0.201)
Powdered soya dummy 1.510 *** (0.134) 1.749 *** (0.127)
Maize dummy -0.755 *** (0.096) -0.976 *** (0.097)
Limestone dummy -2.136 *** (0.151) -1.819 *** (0.140)
Monthly dummies Included (except April) Included (except April)
Year dummies Included (except 1997)
Distance interacted with:
    Port dummy 0.00041 (0.00031) 0.00062 ** (0.00028)
    Water transport dummy -0.00498 *** (0.00164) -0.00859 *** (0.00184)
    Rail transport dummy -0.01538 *** (0.00088) -0.01317 *** (0.00084)
    Monthly dummies Included (except April) Included (except April)
    Year dummies Included (except 1997)
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
          ***  Significant(ly different from zero) at the 1% level; **  Significant at the 5% level; *  Significant at the 10% level
          Dependent variable is Freight Price in units of local currency (at December 1999 prices) per tonne of produce shipped
(I) (III)(II)
Figure 17: Auxiliary OLS regressions for plant-to-market freight cost
the time period), and (ii) labour costs (for unloading the truck, storage handling and
stocking shelves). While sales tax will be perfectly correlated with cement prices, this is
not the case for labour costs. In any case, based again on the field interviews, I assume
that resellers apply a fixed proportional mark-up over the producer price (namely in the
region of 13%) and can then back out producer prices from observed retail prices. To the
extent that (i) labour costs vary across markets, or (ii) some resellers evade taxes, or (iii)
some resellers occasionally choose to price cement as a “loss leader” to lure consumers
into their stores, the reseller mark-up may vary across resellers. This variation, however,
should be small (and the bias, again, is in the direction of overstating marginal cost).
Further, price discrimination by producers on the basis of customer size (i.e. quantity
discounts) is very limited across resellers84. A 5-10% discount may be oﬀered to large
buyers who buy in bulk (ready-mix concrete firms and large construction firms) yet
again this corresponds to a small share of the business compared to that flowing through
resellers. Among the robustness checks I perform, I compare observed producer prices
that I was fortunate to obtain from a subset of producers to the backed-out producer
prices. Finally, to calculate producers’ sales taxes and thus arrive at net producer
84As mentioned earlier, in view of the bulkiness, fast turn and short shelf life of cement, producers
reach far “down the trade”, via direct-from-plant deliveries and own distribution terminals. They resort
to distributors for a minor share of their business. Even a relatively small retailer (reseller) will be able
to place an order directly with the producer; recall that a 15 ton (25 ton) truckload corresponds to only
300 (500) bags.
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prices, I consider federal and state-level tax legislation. Despite the awkwardness of
Brazil’s sales tax system (one needs to compute five diﬀerent sales taxes, namely “ICMS-
normal”, “ICMS-ST”, “IPI”, in addition to the producer’s own collection of “PIS” and
“COFINS”; note further that tax rates vary according to the origin and destination
of the shipment) the total sales tax collected by a producer upon selling to a buyer is
conveniently proportional to the (net or gross) price set. Despite sales taxes on cement
(and on other products in general) being high (e.g. towards the end of the time period
of study, sales taxes owed by a producer located in the state of São Paulo selling to a
buyer located in the same state amounted to 28% of the gross producer price), sales tax
evasion on the part of producers is considered to be minimal. However, to the extent that
producers manage to negotiate reductions in their tax liabilities with state governments
eager to attract investments — negotiations which I do not observe — the marginal cost
I calculate will again be overstated (see the earlier paragraph on unobservables).
A glance at margins Figure 18 displays the by-market evolution of consumer prices,
marginal costs and price-cost margins since July 1994 for nationwide leading firm Vo-
torantim (Figure 18 is the by-state counterpart to Figure 11 in Section 3.3, where these
series are aggregated across the 25 states where Votorantim is present).
Capacity utilisation As mentioned above, among other plant characteristics I ob-
serve capacity. As is usually the case with capacity figures, these are admittedly prone
to considerable measurement error. Nevertheless, I proceed to analysing the evolution of
plant capacity utilisation, including the three years post stabilisation of steep consump-
tion growth (1995 to 1997). Throughout the time period, capacity outstrips production
(including the growth years, although the slack is lower85), with capacity utilisation
hovering around an average 65%. As discussed in Section 4.4.2, capacity seems to play
a strategic role in the industry. Of particular interest, capacity utilisation appears to
be similar across firms and plants, with firms’ capacity utilisation rates being correlated
over time, as firms’ market shares are fairly stable, with some exceptions. This finding
further supports my modelling of marginal cost as being flat in quantity (up to capacity).
To the extent that as capacity utilisation rises, older, smaller and energy-ineﬃcient kilns
may be put back into use, marginal costs may rise as capacity becomes tight.
A.2 Robustness checks on direct measures of marginal cost
In addition to checking my calculation of the reseller’s mark-up on a subset of the data
where I do observe producer prices — thus enabling these to be compared to the producer
prices I back out from observed consumer prices, as explained above — I perform two
other robustness checks of the constructed marginal costs. The first check is centred
on the Portugal-based multinational Cimpor, which in 1997 bought its way into Brazil
and in 1999 became the third largest firm in the country upon acquiring Brennand.
85Note therefore that the post-stabilisation boom in demand did not catch the cement industry
unprepared in terms of capacity. Other industries with tighter capacity facing the same boom in demand
saw either entry (such as imports) or an increase in prices, which clearly was not the experience of the
cement industry (recall that imports were largely kept at bay and, not unrelatedly as I argue in this
paper, prices fell).
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Figure 18: By-market evolution of consumer prices, marginal costs and price-cost mar-
gins since July 1994 (post-stabilisation phase) on Votorantim’s sales. In constant Reais
per bag (at December 1999 values).
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This firm is of particular interest in that it is listed on the Lisbon stock exchange and
chooses to report its financial results broken out by country of operation (and line of
business). I can thus use their reported results for Brazil as a robustness check for
my calculated price-cost margins. The evolution of the calculated price-cost margin,
as a percentage of net producer sales (i.e. net of sales taxes), is graphed in Figure
19. This evolution is compared to Cimpor’s reported EBITDA (earnings before income
tax and depreciation allowance, also known as operating cash flow) as a percentage of
net sales, over the period 1998 to 2003. (I can further check my estimates of resellers’
mark-ups and sales taxes by comparing my calculated net producer sales, backed out
from observed consumer prices, to their reported net sales.) The time series fit between
constructed and reported figures is good. For example, I estimate Cimpor’s average
price-cost margins as a percentage of net producer sales rising from around 47% in
2000 to 56% in 2002. Cimpor reports a similar rise in this period, from 44% to 55%.86
If anything, my calculated price-cost margins are slightly higher than the EBITDA
figures Cimpor reports. This is to be expected, for while my cost estimates include only
(constant) marginal cost, Cimpor’s EBITDA figures are net of other costs such as plant
overhead and sales and administrative expenses. Indeed, my price-cost margins appear
to be conservative (on the low side), as expected from the discussion above regarding
the directional bias in the construction of marginal cost owing to unobservables (in the
way of overstating marginal cost).
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Figure 19: Evolution of the average price-cost margin for firm Cimpor. In constant
Reais x 1000 per month (at December 1999 values) and as a percentage of net producer
sales. Aggregated across all states.
The second additional robustness check is based on accounting data of the cement in-
dustry surveyed annually by the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE)
86Comparing operating cash flow (EBITDA) margins across the 9 countries (in Iberia, Africa and
South America) where Cimpor is active, Brazil’s cement operations are the most profitable: a 55.5%
EBITDA margin in Brazil compared to an average 39.2% across all countries.
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as part of their Annual Industry Survey (PIA) series. Figure 20 depicts the average ac-
counting gross margin (defined as producers’ Net Sales minus Cost of Goods Sold) as
a percentage of net sales for a sample of establishments over the 1990s; the number of
establishments varies between 33 and 55 and only aggregate data is published. The ac-
counting gross margin is high, hovering around 50%. Note that the accounting definition
of Cost of Goods Sold does not include freight expenses but does includes accounting
depreciation, so the accounting gross margin cannot be immediately compared to my
constructed price-cost margin (which does consider freight but not depreciation). Fur-
ther, I do not know the identity of the surveyed establishments. However, the magnitude
of both series appears to be consistent. Of perhaps greater importance, the variation in
the surveyed accounting gross margin is consistent with the observed fall in prices be-
ginning in 1992 and the rise in prices commencing in 1997. (Notice the capital-intensive
nature of the industry: on average payroll — corresponding not only to plant but also
to sales and administrative employees — accounts for less than 10% of a producer’s net
sales.)
Accounting gross margins in the cement industry
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Figure 20: Accounting gross margins in the cement industry, from surveys conducted by
the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE)
B Appendix: Robustness of the structural estima-
tion
B.1 Robustness checks in the demand estimation
It is possible that the estimated market price elasticities of demand, of the order of −0.5,
underestimate the “true” elasticities. I thus proceed to performing some robustness
checks.
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Estimating demand across states simultaneously One would expect that unob-
served demand shocks across states should be correlated. In this case, the residuals
dlt of the market-level equations would be correlated across markets l. Estimating the
17 state-level demand equations simultaneously should thus yield similar estimated co-
eﬃcients but somewhat lower standard errors: while one would hope that both 3SLS
estimates and (equation-by-equation) 2SLS estimates are consistent, the former proce-
dure should improve eﬃciency over the latter87. Though omitted here, I indeed find
3SLS estimates to be similar to those obtained under 2SLS, and the standard errors are
smaller. To take an example, consider again the largest market, São Paulo (SP). Evalu-
ating exogenous demand at the mean of the post-stabilisation phase, the price elasticity
of demand is −0.366 (standard error 0.038). This compares to an elasticity of −0.333
(standard error 0.060) under 2SLS (Figure 12). The average 3SLS-estimated intercept
in the post-stabilisation phase is 7.61 (standard error 0.09), compared to 7.54 (standard
error 0.14) under 2SLS88.
Rather than specifying a demand function for each state, an alternative approach
is to specify only one demand function for the population of states and to run fixed
eﬀects instrumental-variables panel data estimation, treating each state as a unit and
calculating clustered standard errors (i.e. clustering the observations pertaining to a
given state). Compared to specification (12), one would estimate, for example,
log qlt = α1 + α2Ylt + α3 log plt + α4l Ylt log plt + νl + dlt (21)
where α4l and ν l are the market-specific parameters. Notice that, given the vastly larger
number of observations (156 months × 17 states as opposed to 156 months for each
market-level regression) relative to parameters to be estimated, this specification in-
creases eﬃciency at the expense of cross-unit restrictions αjl = αj ∀l,∀j 6= 4. Estimation
results — not shown — again point to very low market price elasticities of demand.
Functional form and reversion of dependent variable It could be that the elas-
ticity estimates are inconsistent and/or biased (downward) due to functional form mis-
specification. To investigate this possibility, I fit alternative functional forms, namely
semi-log-linear and linear, as opposed to the log-linear specification (12), and obtain
similarly low elasticity estimates. For example, I estimate the linear demand equation
qlt = α1l + α2l Ylt + α3l plt + α4l Yltplt + dlt (22)
Though again not shown, the fitted (linear) demand curves in 16 out of the 17 states
rotate anticlockwise upon stabilisation: the coeﬃcient on the interaction term is negative
for these 16 states and significantly so at the 5% level in 13 of them89. The average
87In 3SLS a GLS approach is used to account for the correlation structure in the residuals across the
equations.
88Across states, the (average) post-stabilisation price elasticity seems to be smaller under 3SLS: the
previous mean value across states of −0.41 is now −0.36.
89Recall that Y¯l,post > Y¯l,pre across all states l and realise that with linear demand dqltdplt = α
3
l +α4l Ylt;
thus the fitted demand curve rotates anticlockwise upon stabilisation iﬀ αˆ4l < 0, since the estimated
dqlt
dplt |Y¯l,post −
dqlt
dplt |Y¯l,pre is then αˆ
4
l (Y¯l,post−Y¯l,pre) < 0. The mean elasticity in the pre-stabilisation period
is computed at the means of the variables as (αˆ3l + αˆ4l Y¯l,pre)
P¯l,pre
Q¯l,pre (similarly for the post-stabilisation
period). That demand becomes more elastic as the general price level in the economy stabilises from a
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price elasticity across states, computed for each state at the means for the two sub-
samples, again almost doubles from −0.20 in the pre-stabilisation phase to −0.39 upon
stabilisation, varying in the latter post-stabilisation phase from a minimum (in absolute)
of −0.10 to a maximum of −0.67.
Thus when consumption (or its log) is taken as the dependent variable, market price
elasticities of demand are estimated in each case at around -0.4 to -0.5. On the other
hand, when prices are taken as the dependent variable, the elasticity is estimated to be
higher, at around -0.7 to -0.8. However, the fit suﬀers significantly and the choice of
prices as the dependent variable appears to be forcing the estimation of a higher elasticity.
Figure 21 plots the fit of regression (12) — i.e. a log-linear regression of consumption
on prices — and compares this to the fit of the reverse regression — i.e. a log-linear
regression of prices on consumption90. (Indeed, Carlton (forthcoming) comments that
“it seems to be an empirical regularity that one can often obtain a high elasticity simply
by estimating price on quantity rather than the reverse!” (p. 8))
Weak instruments As for the possibility that demand is not being identified due
to weak instruments, the strong (partial) correlation of the instruments with cement
prices, informed by the structural-theoretic framework, suggests otherwise. As discussed
in Section 4.2, overidentifying restrictions are tested and only a small subset of the set
of available instruments is used (Staiger and Stock 1997). In any case I carry out the
following specification test. I consider only observations from 1991 and 1992 and use the
fact that price controls were dropped in November 1991, leading to a large and immediate
increase in prices, to identify the demand curve (I assume that demand conditions in
this period were largely unchanged.) Estimated elasticities are again of the order of -0.2
to -0.3, in line with the estimates in Figure 14 for the pre-stabilisation phase.
Dynamics Another possibility is that while in the “short-run” the elasticity amounts
to around -0.5, the “long-run” elasticity is higher. Using an autoregressive distributed
lag (ADL) demand specification, where prices are regressed on consumption, lagged
consumption and lagged prices, Röller and Steen (2002) estimate a long-run elasticity
of -1.47, compared to the short-run elasticity of -0.46. The authors argue that “(t)his
high rate of inflation makes for interesting reading. How can one interpret such a finding? Intuitively, as
the rate of change of the prices of goods and services falls, prices become more meaningful to consumers,
carrying greater signal as opposed to noise, making demand more sensitive to variation in prices. Given
the potential error associated with the measurement of prices in an inflationary environment, one must
cautiously interpret the empirical finding that the price elasticity of demand for cement increased upon
stabilisation; however, the estimate that it almost doubled on average across states seems to be a strong
result. Much research has been conducted about the economic eﬀects of general price stabilisation,
but the hypothesis that stabilisation may lead to increased elasticity of demand has not been tested
extensively in the empirical literature. Notice that such an anticlockwise demand rotation would, in the
presence of market power on the part of producers, put downward pressure on prices in equilibrium. In
the case at hand, cement prices did indeed fall concomitant with stabilisation, but I have argued earlier
that, because of the binding imports constraint, this was due to a reduction in the marginal cost of
imports (brought about by an appreciation of the local currency and the trade liberalising reforms of
the early 1990s), rather than a change in the slope of market demand.
90Of note, prices are taken as the dependent variable in the demand estimation of Röller and Steen
(2002) and Parker and Röller (1997); no mention is made regarding the fit of the chosen parametric
form compared to alternatives.
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Figure 21: Goodness of fit in the estimation of demand for the state of Minas Gerais
(MG). Left panel: Fit of a 2SLS regression of log consumption on log exogenous demand,
log price and an interaction variable, as in (12). Right panel: Fit of a 2SLS regression
of log price on log exogenous demand, log consumption and an interaction variable.
is in line with intuition, as other materials like wood and metal can be substituted
for cement in the long run” (p.10). While intuitive, it is not clear why the diﬀerence
between the short-run and the long-run elasticities should be this large, particularly in
the Brazilian context, where cement is sold primarily to small-scale consumers who in
reality do not have substitutes available and, if facing a shortfall, would rather tend to
postpone their construction activities. (Note, for example, that the use of cement in
highway construction, has to date been minimal, and large-scale buyers, who purchase
cement in bulk as opposed to bags, account for only 20% of shipments. One can argue
that dynamic eﬀects of demand by Brazil’s small-scale consumers, to the extent that
they matter at all, may be present in the direction of yielding a lower price elasticity
of demand in the long-term, the reverse of what Röller and Steen estimate for Norway.)
Nor is it clear what is meant by “long-run” and which lags should be included in the
ADL demand specification, particularly to the extent that observations in the present
study are frequent (monthly rather than annual). Further, even if one could theoretically
argue, and empirically demonstrate, that the long-run elasticity were significantly higher,
it is not clear either why producers going about making their supply decisions should
consider a long-term slope for the demand curve as opposed to a short-term one91.
B.2 Other robustness checks: spatial competition
In the cement industry, transportation assumes a significant proportion of cost and
firms’ oﬀerings are spatially diﬀerentiated. I thus review in Salvo (2004) the literature
on spatial competition92 to check whether a plausible substitute (or complement) to my
theoretical framework — the presence of a competitive fringe of imports — can be found.
Any plausible theory should satisfactorily reconcile the low market price elasticity of
91Despite these reservations, I have attempted to estimate an ADL specification à la Röller and Steen
(2002), including 6 to 12 month lags, with no success.
92Examples include Thisse and Vives (1988) on price-setting games and Greenhut and Greenhut
(1975) — applied to the cement industry by McBride (1983) — on quantity-setting games.
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demand with the presence of market power by firms. My motivation stems from the
equilibrium in a well-known example of spatial competition, the Hotelling-type circular
road model. In this model, inelastic market demand does not imply low price-cost
margins (since inelastic market demand does not translate into inelastic demand for the
firm). As I show, however, this result of positive price-cost margins even at local markets
where spatially-diﬀerentiated firms’ market boundaries meet owes to a very special class
of spatial pricing policy assumed in the model, that a firm is restricted to set only a
“mill” price, with delivered prices to consumers who are distributed over space being
equal to the sum of this mill price and the transportation cost. This is not the case
in the Brazilian cement industry, where firms set prices at the local market level (and
these are observed to be quite uniform over space, including those local markets where
many firms meet). I conclude in Salvo (2004) that models of spatial competition do not
provide further insight over the theoretical framework proposed presently93.
B.3 Characteristics of the cement industry and their relation
to the literature on collusion
The table below, based on Ivaldi et al (2003), lists industry characteristics that are un-
derstood to facilitate collusion, summarising the extent to which they characterise the
cement industry94. The purpose of this section is to show that tacit collusion in the
Brazilian cement industry, orchestrated for instance via market division, is a concrete
possibility in that the characteristics of the industry are consistent with those charac-
teristics that the literature suggests make tacit collusion more likely.
Characteristics facilitating collusion Characterise the cement industry?
Few competitors (in a given local market) Yes
Entry barriers Yes
Frequent interaction among firms Yes
Market transparency (1) Yes
Growing demand Yes in some local markets
Mild business cycles (intensity and length) Yes in some local markets
Low innovation Yes
Homogeneous product (low diﬀerentiation) Yes
Low cost asymmetry (2) Yes in some local markets
Low capacity asymmetry No
Evenly-distributed idle capacity Yes in some local markets
Multimarket contact (3) Yes
Low price elasticity of demand in equilibrium (4) Yes
Absence of countervailing buyer power Yes
Structural links between firms (e.g. cross-ownership) Yes in some cases
Small competitors on the fringe Yes
Absence of network eﬀects or learning eﬀects Yes
93Salvo (2004) also estimates a gravity model (a tobit specification) to statistically analyse the flow of
cement between plants and markets, “detecting” outliers in the data, in the spirit of the trade literature.
94A discussion of each characteristic and how it relates to the cement industry is beyond the present
scope. The purpose of the table is to convey a simple message with which most academics and an-
alysts would agree, stated loosely as follows: cement is an archetypal example of an industry whose
characteristics make it more collusion-prone than less.
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Notes to the table: (1) Market transparency. Of note is the (potential) monitoring role
played by the cement producers’ trade association in compiling and sharing data on firm-level
quantities, prices and/or capacity utilisation. (2) Low cost asymmetry. Scherer et al (1975)
report very low economies from multiplant operation in the cement industry. (3) Multimarket
contact. It is worth reflecting on the changes to market structure across time. As mentioned
earlier, of the 19 producers operating in Brazil in 1991, the industry had consolidated to 12
firms by 1999. Yet this came about not in the form of increased concentration at the local
market level, but largely in the form of firms making acquisitions in markets where they did not
previously operate. Thus despite the changes to asset ownership, the number of firms shipping
to any given market has not changed significantly. It is rather multimarket contact which has
increased, in the sense that the number of local markets in which any two producers meet has
gone up considerably over the decade. See Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and the discussion
in Section 4.4.2. (4) Low price elasticity. Ivaldi et al (2003) argue that rather than enhancing
the sustainability of collusion, in the sense of increasing the range of discount factors at which
a collusive equilibrium can be supported, the eﬀect of inelastic demand may be to increase
the profitability of collusion by raising the optimal collusive price. A similar point may be
made regarding market division, by which firms concentrate shipments to those markets where
their plants are located and reduce cross-hauling to neighbouring markets (i.e. to other firms’
backyards). To the extent that under competition one may observe cross-hauling (e.g. under
Cournot competition), the eﬀect of high transport costs, as is the case for cement, may then
be to raise the profitability of a collusive agreement that prescribes large shares in a given
local market to those firms with plants located in that market. While the eﬀect of inelastic
demand works via demand (higher collusive prices increasing the profitability from collusion),
the eﬀect of high transport cost operates via cost (the reduction of cross-hauling increasing
the profitability from collusion). See Section 4.4.2.
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